Sgt. Joshua Anderson of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 113th Field Artillery Regiment, 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team, from Indian Trail, N.C., secures the outside of a home while on a joint patrol with the Iraqi army, south of Baghdad, July 18. (Photo courtesy

Blue Marble-ish stories from our other blogs:

Commodifying Carbon: Turning carbon into just another commodity might not be a bad idea.

Making Lemonade: Congress is so close on the healthcare bill... yet so far.

In With the Old: The new drug czar, like the old one, still thinks marijuana is dangerous.

Global What? Despite George Will, the globe IS still warming.

Fat Cats: Kevin Drum is putting his kitties on a diet. Predicted Inkblot response: hiss!

Making Changes: Is healthcare reform wilting? David Corn opines.

Cougar Convention: Cougars are setting up a den in Palo Alto.


Grizzly Bear
Warp Records

Veckatimest is one of the most anticipated and best-reviewed indie rock records of the year—"a game changer" and rare 9.0 on the Pitchfork scale that is said by The New Yorker to capture "a band in full, collaborative density." On this, its fifth release, Grizzly Bear has expanded its psych-folk sound in multiple directions, making it sweeter and happier, or alternately jazzier and brusquer. The choirboy melodies brood and pine, the odd instruments meet seamlessly and neatly layer. The album took more than a year to make. Which is why, ever since its release in May, I've been wondering how it could be that I like it a lot but don't totally love it. Is the problem with me, or with Grizzly Bear?

If there's a literary analogue to Grizzly Bear, it's Bruce Chatwin's In Patagonia. Chatwin was a gay Londoner who worked at Sotheby's before becoming a travel writer; he built vignettes with the same attention to detail as one might construct the leg of a Chippendale cabinet. Yet this tendency toward the baroque was leavened by the rough beauty of Chatwin's subject matter. The same dialectic animates Williamsburg-based Grizzly Bear: Acoustic plucking, flutes or strings, and nearly effete falsetto harmonies lift us effortlessly on the wings of electric feedback toward the harshly sublime.

Wilco (The Album)

Any Midwesterners worth their salt know Chicago alt-rockers Wilco. They can pick out the unmistakable voice—by turns gravelly and soothing or resigned and rollicking—of front man Jeff Tweedy (interviewed here), or air-drum the intro to Wilco hit "Heavy Metal Drummer." Tweedy and Co. are finally back with the ingeniously titled Wilco (The Album), their most, well, Midwestern release in a decade.

But in this case, Midwestern isn't necessarily a good thing—as it was with Wilco's early, country-infused A.M. and Summerteeth (reviewed here) releases. Once the final song ends, you're more or less left feeling like you just finished a road trip from Minneapolis to Chicago: It's a modestly enjoyable experience with few highlights, and you don't remember much of it a day or two later. (The Album) has a few standout tracks, but unlike Wilco's haunting 2002 Yankee Hotel Foxtrot, there's not much memorable here.

Sunday Dog Blogging

Paul Krugman writes today about the incoherence of the Blue Dog position on healthcare reform: they say they want it to be fiscally neutral, but they relentlessly oppose every effort to actually make it revenue neutral.  Does this mean they're just corporate shills?

I guess I’m not quite that cynical. After all, today’s Blue Dogs are politicians who didn’t go the Tauzin route — they didn’t switch parties even when the G.O.P. seemed to hold all the cards and pundits were declaring the Republican majority permanent. So these are Democrats who, despite their relative conservatism, have shown some commitment to their party and its values.

Now, however, they face their moment of truth. For they can’t extract major concessions on the shape of health care reform without dooming the whole project: knock away any of the four main pillars of reform, and the whole thing will collapse — and probably take the Obama presidency down with it.

I'll bet he was gritting his teeth when he typed that.  My attitude toward the Blue Dogs is a wee bit less charitable than that at the moment, and when he's not writing for public consumption I'll bet Krugman's is too.  The Dogs may be centrists, but someone needs to remind them that they're still supposed to be centrist Democrats.  It's time to fish or cut bait.

Paying the Piper

Matt Yglesias is pessimistic today about the chances of serious healthcare reform:

David Leonhardt has another in a growing series of great David Leonhardt pieces on the nutty and dysfunctional nature of “fee-for-service” medicine in which doctors are paid for doing stuff rather than for treating illness.

The problem, however, is that to totally change how medical professionals get paid would be a big disruptive change, and I see no sign that the public really wants such a change....Opting for the Barack Obama approach where you focus on reassuring people that the status quo won’t change too much seems like a smart play, even though the case for changing things a great deal is very strong.

Generally speaking, this is true.  It's hard to get people to accept the inherent risk of a major change unless they're personally dissatisfied with the status quo.

But this particular issue strikes me as quite different.  After all, how many patients know how their doctors are paid?  How many would care if their doctors were paid a straight salary rather than fee-for-service?  Would any of them be upset if they learned their doctor was switching from one compensation plan to the other?

I doubt it.  Conservatives could undoubtedly gin up some scaremongering talking points on the subject, but fundamentally this isn't something that would be hard to sell to the public.  There are plenty of other complicated issues related to how doctors are compensated1, but I'm not sure that public rebellion is one of them.  As Leonhardt says, this is mostly doctor vs. doctor stuff.

1Oh yes, it's complicated.  Fee-for-service is a problem because it motivates the entire medical industry to order lots of tests and procedures even if they have marginal value.   Boo!  Then there's capitation, where doctors are paid a set annual fee for every patient they take on regardless of how much medical attention they need.  Ordering tests and followup visits eats into the bottom line, so they have an incentive not to overtreat.  Hooray!  But would you want to see a doctor who was highly motivated to offer as little service as possible?  I didn't think so.

Paying doctors a straight salary seems like the best middle ground.  But that just pushes the problem up a level: maybe individual doctors get a salary, but how do you set overall compensation for the medical group or hospital?  And what about physicians in private practice?  You can't very well pay them a salary when they work for themselves, so does private practice go away?  And what about bonuses?  Should doctors be paid more based on some kind of formula for productivity and general wonderfulness?  Would you care to propose such a formula so the rest of can all laugh at it?

Anyway: complicated.

Adjusted for Inflation

In the Washington Post today, David Brown says that as treatment for heart attacks has gotten better, it's also gotten more expensive:

Over the same period, the charges for treating a heart attack marched steadily upward, from about $5,700 in 1977 to $54,400 in 2007 (without adjusting for inflation).

I continue not to understand why anyone would write this.  Why not this instead?

Over the same period, adjusted for inflation, the charges for treating a heart attack marched steadily upward, from about $20,000 in 1977 to $54,400 in 2007.

Technically, Brown's wording is correct.  But it's not helpful, since most people don't have even a vague notion of how much cumulative inflation there's been since 1977.  The revised wording, however, is helpful: it gives people a correct impression of how much more we spend treating heart attacks these days.  Namely, two to three times as much as 30 years ago.

This wasn't just a slip of the keyboard.  Brown and his editor obviously made a deliberate decision to use nominal figures even though this doesn't give the average reader a very good idea of how much costs have actually risen.  I'd sure like to hear their explanation for why they made this decision.

Earlier today I was thinking of responding in more detail to yesterday's Jim Manzi post about George Will's brand of climate change denialism, but before I could get around to it he put up yet another post on the same subject.  You can read them here and here, but I think I can summarize them briefly without doing too much damage to his argument:

If global temperatures are the same tomorrow as they were today, that's not evidence against global warming.  However, if they're the same a thousand years from now as they were today, that is evidence against global warming.  So where's the cutoff point for skepticism?  Five years of no warming?  Ten?  Twenty?

More specifically, what we really want to know isn't merely the trend, but how well the trend observed today matches the predictions made by the scientific community in the past.  That's the only way of knowing whether their models are any good.  George Will may have expressed himself on this point too simplistically, but that's basically the question he's asking.

I guess there are a lot of things I could say about this, but I'll try to keep things brief.

First: Both Will in his column, as well as Manzi in his initial post, suggested that global temps haven't risen for the past ten years.  But that's wrong.  It's true that the warming signal has been pretty flat for the past five or six years, something that skeptics have latched onto gleefully even though it's almost certainly meaningless, but for virtually any recent ten-year span you choose, global temps are up by about 0.2ºC.  This isn't a nitpicky quibble.  Even if you're primarily trying to make a broader point (or, in Will's case, a cutesy point), you're still obligated to represent the data correctly.

Second: It's true that climate models have changed dramatically over the past 20 years as new data has poured in and more people have entered the field.  That makes it hard to judge the success of these models empirically.  The old ones are known to be flawed and the more recent ones haven't been around long enough to be measured.  So perhaps some caution is called for.

As an academic point, that's OK — though in fact, even the very earliest climate model from 1988 seems to have performed pretty well over the past two decades.  But here's the thing: George Will has an enormous readership and he isn't interested in making subtle academic points about epistemology and the nature of scientific uncertainty.  Will, along with most of the conservative establishment, simply wants to fool his audience into believing that the earth is not, in fact, warming.  He has made this absolutely crystal clear on multiple occasions. So when Manzi says this:

The instincts of those who are grasping for some way to hold the tools used to make temperature predictions accountable to reality in some way are sound, even if their method is somewhat misguided. They aren’t idiots or morons, they’re just not specialists.

That's just not supportable.  If Will were genuinely trying to grapple with a difficult subject, he wouldn't cherry pick data in a way that even a high school sophomore could tell him was fraudulent.  Will may not be an idiot or a moron, but as I said in my original post, he is a deliberate charlatan.  Nobody who's serious about the climate change debate should be trying to soft pedal this.

All that said, I agree entirely with Manzi about this:

What’s especially ironic abut a lot of the commentary on the post is that lots of people take assertions of uncertainty in climate forecasts as undercutting the case for emissions mitigation, so those on the Right argue for uncertainty, and those on the Left argue the opposite. In the sophisticated AGW debate, the economic justification for mitigation is seen as, conceptually, an insurance premium. If the expected warming takes place with expected effects, it is very difficult to justify the economic costs of mitigation, and therefore it is a hedge against much-worse-than-expected effects. Therefore, the greater the uncertainty in climate prediction, the stronger the case for mitigation — uncertainty is not our friend. So before you accuse me of intellectual dishonesty, recognize that in pointing out limitations in the current practice of climate model validation, I am actually arguing a point that cuts against my stated policy preference.

As I've mentioned previously, if we could be sure that global temperatures would rise no more than 2ºC over the next century, then you could make a case that it's not worth trying to prevent it.  Not a great case, perhaps, but maybe a defensible one.

But the real reason to get serious about global warming is that we can't be sure of that.  In particular, as more data has come in and our models have gotten better, it's looking more and more as if the likelihood of warming in the range of 4-5ºC or even higher is very real.  That would be undeniably catastrophic, and if there's even a 10% chance of that happening, we need to blow our gaskets trying to stop it.

Unfortunately, here in the real world, that's not why the skeptics are continually blustering about the uncertainty in climate models.  They're doing it because they want people to believe that global warming is a hoax and temperatures over the next century won't rise at all.  No good can come of being useful idiots for this crowd.

"Sometimes she looks like a primary schoolgirl and sometimes a pensioner going shopping."

-- Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Hillary Clinton, July 23, 2009

"...those sad-sack, grandpa jeans were off message."

-- Robin Givhan on Barack Obama, the Washington Post style section, Sunday, July 26, 2009

In the Boston Phoenix, David Bernstein mulls over Sarah Palin's future and suggests that one path she might take is lending her name to a big-time conservative fundraiser who has the infrastructure to rake in the bucks but lacks the star power:

One name-brand who takes that route is radio talk-show host Michael Reagan, son of the late president. He has teamed up with David Bossie — a Republican operative so sleazy that, when Bossie was a top Clinton-scandal investigator for House Republicans, Gingrich had to fire him for having "embarrassed" the effort.

Reagan lends his name and face as "co-founder" of, among other things, Bossie's Presidential Coalition. That PAC raised and spent about $6.5 million in 2007–'08....Of that $6.5 million, three-quarters was spent on fundraising....More than $400,000 of the rest went to salaries....mostly to Bossie and his cohort Michael Boos.

After rent, insurance, and legal and accounting fees, that left less than $150,000 — about two percent of the contributions — to put to actual use.

Of course, once people start contributing, you can make money just by renting their names to other fundraisers.  So what would a list of Palin's true believer fans be worth?  Bernstein's list of the drawing power of other conservative stars is on the right, and it's an interesting metric of who the big draws in wingnut land really are.  I'm not sure where Palin would slot in on that list, but surely she could outdraw Fred Thompson, couldn't she?

(Via Conor Friedersdorf.)