Talk Back to Todd Gitlin
Commentary: Can you support a war and still be a liberal?
September 1, 1999
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Todd Gitlin's controversial essay, "The End of the Absolute No," which appeared in the September/October 1999 issue of Mother Jones magazine, has drawn an unusually strong response from readers. The MoJo Wire is hosting this space for a dialogue between the author and his audience.
Tony Reeves
Madison, WI
I have grave qualms about the manner in which the decision to intervene in Kosovo was made. I admit I am somewhat self-interested: as a reservist, I have been called up before and could be called up again. Having said that, I have two concerns:
- It is inconsistent with my idea of democratic government that the President should make a unilateral decision to bomb Kosovo in the face of opposition from a majority in Congress.
- We as regular and reservist service members have a right to know that our government goes to war with an undivided mind, after all facts have been discussed openly and vigorously in the forum best able to accommodate and express partisan differences: Congress. Bush, for all his failings, was willing to take the risk of allowing Congress the right to debate the wisdom of the Gulf War. Clinton was not willing to do so with Kosovo. That is as much a part of his legacy as any other of his successes and failures.
I cannot minimize the importance I attach to my second point. Pericles was able to say 2,500 years ago that the glory of Athens was that it didn't dash madly into military adventures. The same men who would take the risks of combat first debated the political options as citizens. Why are those who represent us today unable to bear this deliberative burden? The cynic in me suggests that it is because, with an all volunteer army, their children are not the ones taking the risks. Rather, it is the children of people who never made a campaign contribution, and who were too poor to attend a $500-dollar-a-plate fund raiser.
My words may sound harsh. Perhaps, in the time it takes for Congress to deliberate and the President to cooperate by providing it the information it needs for an informed decision, untold Kosovar Albanians would have died. But by allowing congressional deliberation to atrophy, we may be allowing our own republican institutions to die a slow death of gangrene. Which, in the long run, would be worse for America and the world?
Todd Gitlin responds:
Tony, you raise the most cogent objection I know to the Kosovo intervention -- as also, equally, to every other American intervention since World War II. (The Gulf war was in a certain sense more legitimate than the others since, as you say, Congress did debate. On the other hand, that was a nonbinding debate, not a debate over a declaration of war as provided for in the Constitution. Still, it was a debate.) I share your grave qualms about the circumvention of Congress -- to which I would add that Congress tends to be as parochial as the people that elect it. So here is the dilemma: There are great evils in the world, avoidable evils, that will not be addressed by effective means unless the US Constitution is circumvented. This is a good reason why the Secretary General of the UN ought to have a standing constabulary force, a professional force, at his or her disposal -- but in a sense such a force would only move the democratic dilemma onto a global plane, where no institution exists that even in principle has the authority to commit armed force.
To this dilemma there is no happy resolution. Surely Congress should have deliberated. But in their foolishness they might well have decided badly, as they did by signing on to Lyndon Johnson's war by overwhelmingly passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964. We could well say that any US president ought to lead a popular debate anytime a commitment to armed force is contemplated. But any presidential candidate who ran on a platform declaring such a commitment in advance would run into a buzz-saw. Then what? Should we, who care about human rights, wash our hands of the matter in a case like Kosovo? For myself, I would not have been willing, but if you say that the democratic imperative would have demanded exactly that, I can only say, you're right. No pretty answers. A far-sighted politician would face the dilemma squarely, resist the gangrene of the republic, and suffer the consequences. He would also note -- no small matter -- that US nuclear war policy intrinsically violates the Constitution insofar as it contemplates a first strike by presidential command.
I wouldn't agree, by the way, with the implication that Clinton "dashed madly" into the bombardment. He staved off interventions both in Kosovo and Bosnia for years while Milosevic pursued his terror campaigns.
I note that, in passing, you make a democratic argument in behalf of a draft. This would make a lot of people nervous, but the debate would be well worth having. Still, it seems to me that the public doesn't want the responsibility either for debating war, or declaring war, or fighting war. I wish I could feel morally cleansed by this all-around reluctance, but I don't. I see only evasion.
Jeffrey J. Weber
It seems to me that the disagreement on the left as to the wisdom of militarily intervention raised a broader question that was not addressed in your article. Your article notes that the left generally had a reflexive condemnation of any US military action, presupposing that it was simple imperialist aggression. Now, there is honest disagreement among the left as to whether this reflexive "No" should still be applied. The left assumes its own good intentions yet accepts as fact the bad intentions of its opponents. Isn't it possible that your opponents -- or at least some of them -- really weren't motivated by imperialism even in the past? That there was an honest disagreement between right and left as to whether intervention would cause more harm than good? The fact that there is now dissension among the left should require a reexamination of your assumptions as to the motives of those you opposed and condemned in the past.
Todd Gitlin responds:
The motives of those who wanted to intervene in Vietnam, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, etc. were various, but their motives were not the point. Many motives in politics are decent, or at least partially defensible in the abstract. The problem is that reasonable motives led to bad consequences, and that the advocates of the Vietnam, El Salvador, Nicaragua expeditions in particular were blind, sometimes willfully blind, to those consequences, even covered them up in the name of a Cold War obsession that, like many another obsession, itself had many defensible intentions, but whose disproportionate pursuit wreaked much avoidable damage. I agree that one's opponents may have honorable motives, and that name-calling is not a substitute for argument.
Wade Hudson
Todd, you pose a red herring. Most of the opponents of the war against Yugoslavia (most of whom deplored Serb atrocities against Albanians) are not absolutists, as demonstrated by our support for intervention in Haiti and East Timor.
You claim that this particular war was justified because it accomplished "the Kosovars' safe resettlement." But this end has been achieved only for Kosovar Albanians, who now continue their atrocities against Serbs. Where is your outrage about atrocities against Serbs?
Concerning your "challenge" for alternatives, I offer the following. Early on, rather than encouraging the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and consistently taking anti-Serb positions, US/NATO could have played the role of a neutral broker, supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and utilized nonviolent means to advance the cause of human rights within that nation. These methods included cultural exchanges, trade, the flow of information, conflict-resolution teams, international observers, public rebukes, stronger support for nonviolent Albanian activists, negotiation, and patience.
Prior to the bombing, European observers in Kosovo were a major deterrent against atrocities. Increasing the number of those observers while negotiations continued was an obvious alternative to immediate warfare. Even Henry Kissinger, on April 5 in Newsweek, stated, "It was a grave error to abandon any effort to strengthen the observers already in Kosovo."
Moreover, Western governments could have increased moral and financial assistance to peace-oriented non-governmental organizations, both directly and indirectly. It's hard to see how anyone can say now, after all the terror, that these options should not have been pursued.
You claim that Milosevic could not be trusted to negotiate. But we trusted him to negotiate a Bosnian settlement. Milosevic is a politician; as such, he has always been willing to negotiate.
If anyone was unwilling to negotiate, it was US/NATO. A top-level Administration official admitted to the press off the record that US/NATO purposely "set the bar too high." They gave Milosevic an offer he had to refuse. These demands, the infamous Rambouillet accords, would have allowed Western troops free movement throughout Yugoslavia, which would have been an unacceptable sacrifice of sovereignty. Moreover, the Rambouillet plan would have allowed for a vote on Kosovar independence that would have almost certainly led to complete independence. For these reasons, US/NATO knew that Yugoslavia would reject the demands. Making non-negotiable demands is hardly the way to negotiate.
The US/NATO coalition could have engaged in genuine negotiations to achieve a lasting solution. The fact that US/NATO never did negotiate seriously will make it impossible for anyone to ever justify the war.
Your proposed necessary conditions for a "just war" were not met. Prior to the bombing, the consequences of failing to bomb were not unbearable (bombing worsened the atrocities), the ends (multi-ethnic peace) were not achieved by the war, and the means were not proportional (US/NATO illegally waged war on the entire Yugoslav civilian society).
Todd, you are correct to reject automatic opposition to US military intervention. And you are correct to argue that the global community needs effective intervention to defend human rights. But Kosovo demonstrates that we must develop and utilize non-violent alternatives before so quickly resorting to military force.
And we should never inflict the full power of American air power against civilian populations merely because we are unwilling to risk American lives by sending in ground troops. Such methods undermine any claim to a "just war."
Todd Gitlin responds:
My outrage against the counteratrocities is great -- and by the way, I wrote my article not long after the war ended, before the attacks on the Serbs. But my defense of the intervention -- or a more effective intervention, perhaps on the ground -- was not predicated on the expectation of a perfect outcome. I thought, and think, the result would be bad -- as it is. All I argue is that it is less bad than a failure to intervene. Surely the best thing to do now that Albanians killing and maiming Serbs, is to support a more effective intervention -- i. e., bolster the UN patrols and try to get the KLA to police Albanian terrorists.
I surely agree that the US should have opposed the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The Europeans (especially the Germans) were principally to blame for encouraging Croatia and Slovenia, but the US shares the blame. The problem was, what should the US have done once that original sin was committed in 1991? I advocated most of the "nonviolent means" you propose, but what was to be done if 1) they weren't undertaken, or 2) they were undertaken but proved fruitless? The US, NATO, and the UN did a lot of the things you list. The results? A failure to stop Milosevic from steadily enlarging the sphere of massacre. Remember, for example, that there were already UN observers on the ground in Kosovo as the Serb massacres intensified.
Consider this analogy: The US (and England and France) should have intervened against Nazi Germany in 1935, when Hitler took the Rhineland, and in 1936, in Spain, to name only two junctures. Since they failed to do right again and again, should the US have failed to go to war in Europe in 1941? How many wrongs make a right?
You may well be right that the US set the negotiation bar too high, hoping for a rejection at Rambouillet, which would be seen to justify the bombing that Secretary of State Albright thought would force him to back down in a few days. (I have heard such rumors.) I don't know enough to declare that the US negotiated as effectively as it might. All I know that Milosevic is a slippery, self-seeking Communist thug whose record of deal-breaking is long.
Finally, aerial bombing is, as you say, vile -- but the bombardment we actually launched was not killing for killing's sake, as at Dresden. A ground war might have been more effective (or might not), as well as less cowardly. Does this mean you would have supported it? Very few Americans would have. There was also an argument, made tellingly by Dan Ellsberg, that a ground intervention would prompt Milosevic to slaughter many more Kosovars, in a sort of desperado genocide. So the war we fought was a dirty war, as you say, but that doesn't make it unjust. I still don't see the realistic alternative. Thanks for writing.
Dave Dembeck
Norfolk, NE
Todd, the primary reason why many on the left have been able to rationalize Kosovo is that the war in Kosovo was being promoted by "one of their own", namely Bill Clinton, whereas the other recent examples you cited were fought under administrations to which the Left was hostile. Moreover, the intervention took place at a time when Clinton was "on the ropes" politically and opposition by the left to Kosovo could have tipped the scales enough to have brought him down.
Had the intervention in Kosovo taken place under a conservative Republican president, the reaction of the vast majority on the left would have continued to be "absolute no".
Todd Gitlin responds:
Dave, You are still not addressing the core question, which is: What should have been done for Kosovo?
If, in fact, the general left-wing reaction to a hypothetical Republican intervention in Kosovo -- or Bosnia, or Haiti -- would have been yet another automatic no, that would have been shameful. In my opinion, the moral imperative in the face of great, avoidable suffering in the world is far more urgent than the question of whose political ox is being Gored, or Bushed, or Clintoned.
Lanny Sinkin
Immediate past Co-Chair of the Hawaii County Green Party
Todd Gitlin's "The End of Absolute No" presents an interesting challenge.
Is Mr. Gitlin a pied piper leading the peace-and-love generation back on to the slippery slope of "just wars"? Frankly, I think he missed the point altogether.
As coordinator of Vietnam Summer in Cambridge, Mass., and an advocate for more than 35 years, I trust I qualify as a "veteran activist" as well. As an attorney for the Christic Institute for five years, I also had a particularly informative look at the operations of the national security establishment. From this perspective, I would urge those who have traveled the paths of peace to stay the course.
The comparison I like to make is between a squash and hierarchy.
If you open a ripe squash, the squash is filled with seeds from which hundreds of more squash can be grown. That's nature's way -- abundance. If the human population reestablished its harmony with nature, that abundance would be available to all.
There are forces, however, that do not want such harmony reestablished because they thrive on scarcity as a means to rule over others.
To create scarcity and hierarchy, these forces must achieve two goals:
- break the link between most people and the natural order, so that people are dependent on manufactured goods and on "jobs" to earn the money to pay for such goods and
- limit the resources available to most people either through massive waste or overpopulation.
The most recent historical manifestation of this pattern is the military/corporate/intelligence/narcotics complex.
Monsanto seeks to create seeds that will not propagate. Then every season, anyone wishing to farm has to return to Monsanto for their seed. The terminator gene is only the latest idea from those who would create a barrier between humans and natural abundance.
The single biggest waste of resources is achieved through war. Trillions of dollars go to the manufacturing of tools useful only in war. When war is achieved, those tools are destroyed and must be replaced with new tools, which usually cost far more than the ones destroyed. The buildings and facilities destroyed must also be reconstructed at tremendous cost. In order to maintain an adequate level of waste (and thereby create scarcity and exert control), there must be constant preparation for and encouragement of war.
Kosovo is simply the latest manifestation of this overall policy. In order to make a war and achieve a significant level of waste, there are certain elements which need to be nurtured, such as a single individual who can be demonized as the "cause" of the war, suffering by people capable of producing an outrage/sympathy reaction which in turn produces support for the war, ignorance regarding the conditions and historical events which produced the war, and secrecy for the covert operations preparing the ground work for the war.
Surely Mr. Gitlin knows that what we see on the world stage is rarely what is really happening. He states he would not have opposed the war against Saddam Hussein had he known about Iraq's warheads with anthrax and nuclear weapons program. Has he forgotten the slant drilling by Kuwait into Iraqi oil fields or the signal from US Ambassador April Glaspie that the US considered the dispute between the two countries a matter outside the US area of concern? I do not wish to argue the history of that particular war so much as to make the point that we should never assume we are being shown the entire picture by those who want to control our thinking and use our energy for their purposes.
Communism having lost its cachet as a Pavlovian bell rung to justify war, new concepts have to be embraced. Human rights is now being dragged into the mud as a reason for conducting war.
One means of resolving the debate Mr. Gitlin seeks to engender is to ask yourself the following question: If the United States took the military budget and the covert budget for one year -- say roughly $400 billion -- and spent that money training real peacemakers to serve the world community, creating opportunities for dialogue and negotiations among people engaged in disputes, providing basic necessities for people in need, and otherwise targeted the money toward building harmony in the human community, would we even be having this discussion? If you think there is a possibility that reallocating our resources to peace would actually produce peace, then there is no reason to embrace war simply because we lack the political power at the moment to achieve that reorientation.
One of the pillars of the Hawaii Green Party is nonviolence. I believe that commitment represents an understanding that violence is never the solution and only produces more violence. For some of us, that commitment is also an understanding that violence at the society level is a mind game played by those who benefit from violence.
Todd Gitlin responds:
Mr. Sinkin wants global peacemaking. So do I. But it cannot be had through a global listening tour, however well-funded. We need an armed UN force, in readiness, as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan last week, to go where needed to avert massacre and enforce UN resolutions -- with the important qualification that it must be practical, it must stand a good chance of doing some good when it intervenes. This should be closer to a police force than a blast-all army, and best if it is composed largely of soldiers from mid-size powers, and not the US. But it must be a professional armed force, because nothing else has a prayer of accomplishing anything. In the meantime, Mr. Sinkin ducks my challenge: In the absence of such a force, what was to be done for the Kosovars?
As for Iraq, one comes to political judgments on the basis of the best possible information. I am not naive about the failings of the press, establishment and otherwise. But I am not prepared to use those failings as an excuse for another failing: Failing to do what one can, given the best information one has,to serve justice.
