A Savage War of Peace
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Much like the Vietnam War haunts Americans, the horror and brutality of the Algerian War haunts the French people. The brutality of the war was again exposed in November 2001 when a former French general, who admitted in a book published in May 2001 to the torture and execution of dozens of Algerians during the war, was put on trial and found guilty. General Paul Aussaresses was charged, not with the acts themselves which had long been covered by an amnesty, but for publishing an unapologetic version of them in his book, Services Spéciaux Algérie 1955-1957.
Expressing no remorse for his actions, either in the book or on the witness stand, General Aussaresses admitted to the summary execution of 24 men and to supervising the torture of dozens of others. Arguing torture was the best way to make a terrorist talk, he told the court his actions were justified, adding he would do the same again “if it were against Osama bin Laden.” Of the hundreds of executions he ordered, the general added, “I was indifferent. They had to be killed, that's all there was to it.”
Winning the Battle of Ideas
A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 remains a good read; however, whether or not it should be required reading for U.S. officers serving in Iraq, together with their civilian and military bosses in the White House and Pentagon, depends on the lessons learned. From the perspective of more than a half-century, the Algerian War might seem to some as a precursor to the amorphous struggles now raging in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflicts in which religious faith, imperialism, nationalism, and terrorism reach unimagined degrees of intensity, instead of what it was, the last colonial war. This may explain in part its popularity in the Bush administration.
That said, any suggestion that the conditions the United States faces in Iraq mirror those the French encountered in Algeria is off the mark. If the White House is weighing the tactical choices reflected in A Savage War of Peace, the Algerian War would appear to exemplify what not to do in Iraq as opposed to being a user manual for U.S. forces. There is a certain allure to the use of brutal and repressive means to fight clandestine terrorists which some may find attractive; however, the French experience in Algeria demonstrates this is a false path to success. French tactics in Algeria lost the battle for the hearts and minds of Algerians, and in the end, the war itself.
Mounting evidence suggests that the Bush administration is drawing the wrong lessons from Algeria. To be successful in the war on terrorism, you must first win the battle of ideas. American tactics in Iraq, as symbolized by the abuse and humiliation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison and the wanton and methodical murder of civilians at Haditha, suggest a breakdown in moral authority and leadership, similar to what the French experienced in Algeria.
“Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company,” a two-hour documentary about an Ohio marine reserve unit which lost 24 men in Iraq, strongly reinforces this impression. Shown on Memorial Day weekend, this powerful window into the harsh reality of war includes several interviews with young marines who, out of anger and frustration, readily admitted at times to being on the brink of committing violent acts against Iraqi non-combatants.
In the case of Haditha, there remains an open question as to whether this was an isolated incident or the product of what is known as “command climate,” the pressure from up-the-chain-of-command to produce results, pressure which can cause over-reaction as I witnessed first-hand as an army intelligence officer in the Vietnam War. The prolonged incarceration without trial of prisoners at Guantánamo and the policy of rendition simply compound the negative results of this unholy mix. By all means, read Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, but read it not to learn how to win the war in Iraq and the broader war on terrorism, but how to lose it.
Ronald Bruce St John, an analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org), has published extensively on Middle Eastern issues for almost three decades. He is the author most recently of the Historical Dictionary of Libya and Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife.
