by Jeffrey Benner
Aug. 26, 1999

As East Timor stands poised to break away from Indonesia, secessionist sentiments are reported to be on the rise in the provinces of Riau, Kalimantan, Ambon, and Bali. Secessionist movements are already well developed in the resource-rich provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya. In Aceh, armed rebels have been fighting the Indonesian military for years. More than 200 people, most of them civilians and about 40 Indonesian soldiers, have reportedly been killed since May, and some 150,000 refugees have recently fled the fighting. Should East Timor be allowed to break away, there is rising concern that provinces such as Aceh will capitalize on the precedent and attempt to follow suit. Could the referendum in East Timor spark the balkanization of Indonesia?

Donald Emmerson, a professor of political science and Southeast Asian studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, doesn't think so. "Indonesia is not Yugoslavia," he said, "and B. J. Habibie is not Slobodan Milosevic." Emmerson sees several key differences between the two countries. Indonesia, while diverse, does not have the long history of ethnic hatred seen in the Balkans. Also, while Yugoslavian ethnic groups were on opposing sides during World War II, Indonesians were unified in their resistance to the Japanese occupation, and fought together to liberate the nation from Dutch imperialism. Emmerson says those who argue that letting East Timor go will lead to the breakup of the nation "underestimate the strength of Indonesian identity."

George Friedman, chairman of private intelligence firm Stratfor and a leading expert in Asian affairs, is -- to say the least -- less optimistic. "Indonesia is not a single country," he said, "it is an imperial invention." Friedman says the forces which held the state together in the past -- nationalist populism under Sukarno and economic growth under Suharto -- have now evaporated. His outlook for Indonesia's future is bleak. "It is descending into chaos," he said, "and I see nothing to reverse that trend." Regarding the aptness of comparisons to Yugoslavia, he observed, "There is enough ethnic hate [in Indonesia] to make Kosovo look warm and fuzzy."

Emmerson does not think that just because East Timor may gain its independence, other provinces will necessary want -- or be able -- to do the same. East Timor was never a part of the Dutch East Indies, unlike all other Indonesian provinces. Most East Timorese, even after a quarter-century of occupation, still do not speak the Indonesian national language, Bahasa Indonesia. Most East Timorese are Catholic, not Muslim like the vast majority of Indonesians. Quite simply, he argues that East Timor is not Indonesian, while the other provinces, even allowing for their idiosyncracies, share a common national heritage.

Indonesian officials are relying on just that sort of argument to dismiss the Free Aceh movement's demands that their province be allowed to hold a referendum on independence just like East Timor. In a recent interview, President B. J. Habibie reportedly said, "East Timor is just like Puerto Rico. Aceh is just like, for the United States, Georgia. You cannot separate Georgia."

That may be so, but human-rights groups fear Habibie may be planning to take a page out of General Sherman's strategy book to avoid losing Aceh. According to Amnesty International, on July 23 Indonesian soldiers massacred at least 40, and possibly as many as 70, unarmed civilians in West Aceh. It was just one episode in an ongoing series of violent clashes and killings. With 11,000 soldiers already in the province, Indonesian armed forces chief General Wiranto is threatening to declare a state of emergency in Aceh, accompanied by an expanded military campaign against the rebels.

Yet, while the short-term situation looks bleak, Emmerson still sees no cause for apocalyptic predictions about the impending breakup of Indonesia. He sees the troubles in the provinces as predictable reactions now that "the lid of a repressive regime has suddenly been lifted." He said these are negative results of something which is, overall, a positive development: the democratization of Indonesia. The democratic reform going on now, he says, "implies a shift in power away from the center" and, as such, "is a source of hope, not despair."

But Friedman disagrees. "The idea that democracy stabilizes countries is an ... interesting one," he says with unconcealed irony. "However, I see no historical precedent for it." He thinks the current "reformasi" in Indonesia is being misinterpreted by the West in very much the same way that perestroika was mistakenly viewed as a sign of health in the former USSR. "We are confusing decay with reform," he said.

Some people, both inside and outside Indonesia, are flirting with the idea of federalism -- a confederation of semiautonomous provinces -- as a possible solution to the country's problems. It was a politically taboo topic during Sukarno's and Suharto's rules, but Amien Reis, a candidate in the recent Indonesian presidential elections, recently brought it up as a possibility.

This year, the Indonesian parliament passed legislation giving more direct political representation to the provinces, as well as guaranteeing that more wealth from natural resources would stay in the provinces from which they come. This is a particularly important concession for oil- and gas-rich Aceh, and for Irian Jaya, which is home to the world's largest gold mine. Both provinces contribute billions to government coffers and receive only a small fraction of that amount in public services and investments in return.

Emmerson points to this kind of legislation as reason for optimism. He sees the underlying causes of secessionism as fundamentally -- but not exclusively -- economic. "Cases of pure ethnic hatred are hard to find," he said. "They usually line up with economic distinctions and the collapse of the economy." If the provinces could gain more economic and political power, he believes the country could be held together. "There is a wide spectrum [of possibilities for the provinces] between straightforward 'unity' ... and total independence," he said.

Friedman sees things in far more black-and-white terms: Either a strong center will reemerge, or chaos will rule. Unlike Emmerson, he does not see federalism as a viable solution. According to Friedman, a federalist system requires strong institutions, something Indonesia lacks. Even with developed civic institutions, he says, a federalist system may have trouble holding countries together. "Yugoslavia practiced federalism," he points out, "[and it] broke apart." For Friedman, assuming the provinces can be appeased with more money, less abuse, and more political enfranchisement, the fundamental question remains unanswered: "How will the center hold?"

With its strongest leader fallen, the provinces in rebellion, the economy in shambles, the military and civic administration feuding, and the presidency still up for grabs, Indonesia appears to be in a desperate struggle to regain solid footing. Emmerson believes Indonesian national identity will prove strong enough to see the country through this unstable, but hopeful, period of "democratization." Friedman sees no force -- at least inside the country -- strong enough to reverse the current trend, which he views as a slow disintegration of the Indonesian state.

Perhaps the only thing upon which both men agree is that, when viewed in the context of the national crisis in Indonesia, losing control of tiny East Timor should be among the more minor of Jakarta's worries. As for whether the country's situation as a whole calls for optimism or pessimism, it depends on whom you ask.