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Maliki and the Sunnis
MALIKI AND THE SUNNIS....I've written before about this, but today Shawn Brimley and Colin Kahl tell us yet again that Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite government in Baghdad is refusing to incorporate former Sunni militiamen into Iraq's security forces — and that this may soon lead to a renewed outbreak of insurgency. There are lots of things to say about this, but I think this paragraph gets to the heart of things:
The "surge" strategy in Iraq, as described by President Bush in January 2007, rested on the belief that tamping down violence would provide a window of opportunity that Iraq's leaders would use to pursue political reconciliation. But this has not occurred, despite the dramatic security improvements. Indeed, if the problem in 2006 and 2007 was Maliki's weakness and inability to pursue reconciliation in the midst of a civil war, the issue in 2008 is his overconfidence and unwillingness to entertain any real accommodation with his political adversaries. America's blank check to the Iraqi government feeds this hubris.
This problem repeats itself constantly in debates over Iraq policy: no matter what happens, there's a reason to continue doing what we're doing. If Maliki is too weak, he can't compromise with the Sunnis. But now he's too strong, so he doesn't have to compromise with the Sunnis. In either case American troops need to stick around. Likewise, when violence is high, we have to stay to crush it out. But when violence is low, we can't leave because the peace is so fragile. Elections, ditto. Infrastructure, ditto. Regional squabbles, ditto. It's never quite the right time for us to leave.
Brimley and Kahl, like a lot of others, are convinced that there's still some kind of magical middle ground where Maliki is a strong enough leader to enforce his will on a fractured country but a weak enough leader that the U.S. can exert meaningful leverage over him. Unfortunately, this is almost certainly a delusion. That middle ground is a target about an inch wide and nearly impossible to hit, let alone keep our balance on for long. So what happens when Maliki decides it's time to consolidate Shiite power? Joe Klein:
The question now is: what can — or should we do about this? Whose side are we on if Maliki launches the crackdown? Brimley and Kahl think we can influence Maliki's behavior by threatening to withold U.S. military support — but that may be exactly what the overconfident Maliki wants. Then again, what choice do we have? I doubt that even John McCain will argue that the role of the U.S. military will be to defend the Sons of Iraq in the coming battle. My guess is that the end result in Iraq is an authoritarian Maliki- or military-led Shi'ite government, less toxic than Saddam Hussein's, which will stand closer to Iran than to Saudi Arabia in the regional Sunni-Shi'ite contest. The war in Iraq will not have been "lost," but can this be reasonably described as "victory?" I think not. It can be best described as a terrible, shameful waste of lives and resources.
One way or another, Iraqis are going to solve Iraq's problems. Our presence only puts off that day, it doesn't eliminate it. More here from Marc Lynch.
Hon. Sen. McCain needs to confront this question in the debates?if not sooner, but for sure in a forum that's nationaly televised in in which he cannot evade the issue. How is it a useful purpose of our military to preserve a status quo which seemingly has not other purpose than to facilitate our continued presence in a country which decidedly wants us out? It is getting harder to escape the conclusion that the purpose of the Surge was less to make space in Iraq for political reconciliation than to promote space for preserving Republican continuity in the US.
I like the idea of Hon. Sen. Biden hitting this point in what I anticipate will be a pleasingly lopsided VP debate.
Hon. Sen. McCain needs to confront this question in the debates?if not sooner, but for sure in a forum that's nationaly televised in in which he cannot evade the issue. How is it a useful purpose of our military to preserve a status quo which seemingly has not other purpose than to facilitate our continued presence in a country which decidedly wants us out? It is getting harder to escape the conclusion that the purpose of the Surge was less to make space in Iraq for political reconciliation than to promote space for preserving Republican continuity in the US.
I like the idea of Hon. Sen. Biden hitting this point in what I anticipate will be a pleasingly lopsided VP debate.
The surge has merely produced a truce, not a peace. The press, of course, doesn't know the difference, and John McCain wouldn't recognize it if he walked into it while on Ambien.
But then has the concept of "victory" ever made any sense here. The only way I could imagine using the term, is if we ended up with a totally compliant country to milk for its resources. But that is not going to happen. So we are left with "victory" as the description if we have a McCain administration. If Obama wins, the identical end-state, will be described as a surrender-monkey "defeat". But the reality, is, no matter who wins, our misadventure will be over by 2011, and a chaotic Iraq will remain. And we will retain little influence there.
it's really just amazing that we still have to point this fundamental stuff out.
Hon. Sen. McCain needs to confront this question in the debatesif not sooner, but for sure in a forum that's nationaly televised in in which he cannot evade the issue. How is it a useful purpose of our military to preserve a status quo which seemingly has not other purpose than to facilitate our continued presence in a country which decidedly wants us out? It is getting harder to escape the conclusion that the purpose of the Surge was less to make space in Iraq for political reconciliation than to promote space for preserving Republican continuity in the US.
I like the idea of Hon. Sen. Biden hitting this point in what I anticipate will be a pleasingly lopsided VP debate.
First the radical right says its our moral duty empower Sadadam against Iran (1980s); then its our moral duty to overthrow Saddam and empower the Shitites; then it's our moral duty to empower the Sunnis and "never walk away from them". This is what happens when every conflict in the world is defined by the bright-line morality play than passes for a foreign policy on the radical right.
First the radical right says its our moral duty...
Clearly it's our moral duty to keep the radical right far from power.
Perhaps you've heard of Goldilocks? Too violent, too peaceful, too fragile, somehow, just not right for withdrawal. I think I'll take a nap. (This house's bed is tooo hard; this house's bed is tooo soft....)
But if the insurgency starts up again, that means we'll have to stay forever to restore order. Oh boy!
Decent articles by Brimley & Kahl and Klein, although I take issue with two points that have resonance.
(1) Brimley & Kahl write:
"The 'surge' strategy in Iraq, as described by President Bush in January 2007, rested on the belief that tamping down violence would provide a window of opportunity that Iraq's leaders would use to pursue political reconciliation."
--But exactly WHO believed this? Certainly not Petraeus, who has always played down its possibilities, and certainly not the Democrats who opposed the surge, because they stated clearly that it was simply putting-off the inevitable. All of them are on record -- Obama, Biden, Pelosi, etc. Murtha for example called it "delusional." They could be faulted for not seeing how it would reduce violence, and they had to eat a little crow as it reduced violence in the meantime, but their strategic reading of it still stands.
Compare McCain, who still hopes to trick the U.S. public by wishful thinking and vainglory into 100 more years of surging. Which is just about how long it would really take. Of course McCain may not actually intend to do this. He may just be saying it to get votes.
But if Biden can explain the meaning of the surge -- what it meant to the foreign policy community before, and what it means for everybody now -- in the vice-president debates, the Dems will handily win the White House. I think that most of the U.S. voters would like to hear the truth about the situation.
(2) I also think it's very clear from both articles that the next step is to make al Maliki the bad guy in this. This is wrong, wrong, wrong -- the U.S. public should NOT be led into believing this, though no doubt the neocons will give it the good ol' college try, to get the public on board for replacing him with a secular strongman. Which would be ghastly mistake.
Maliki is not a political actor in the Western sense. He's not "consolidating his power," he didn't even want the job. All roads lead to the Ayatollah. There is not going to be a George Washington arising in this -- it is not possible to wield that kind of influence in the Islamic political tradition.