From the Annals of Airport Security
FROM THE ANNALS OF AIRPORT SECURITY....Jeffrey Goldberg and Bruce Schneier explain why the no-fly list is not just a gargantuan monster that's gotten completely out of hand and made the lives of uncounted innocent people miserable, but a useless gargantuan monster that's gotten completely out of hand and made the lives of uncounted innocent people miserable:
To slip through the only check against the no-fly list, the terrorist uses a stolen credit card to buy a ticket under a fake name. "Then you print a fake boarding pass with your real name on it and go to the airport. You give your real ID, and the fake boarding pass with your real name on it, to security. They're checking the documents against each other. They're not checking your name against the no-fly list that was done on the airline's computers. Once you're through security, you rip up the fake boarding pass, and use the real boarding pass that has the name from the stolen credit card. Then you board the plane, because they're not checking your name against your ID at boarding."
What if you don't know how to steal a credit card?
"Then you're a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you," he said.
What if you don't know how to download a PDF of an actual boarding pass and alter it on a home computer?
"Then you're a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you."
I couldn't believe that what Schneier was saying was true in the national debate over the no-fly list, it is seldom, if ever, mentioned that the no-fly list doesn't work. "It's true," he said. "The gap blows the whole system out of the water."
Other tips: you can carry all the liquid on board a plane that you want as long as you put it in a bottle marked "saline solution." Or hide it on your person in a Beerbelly. Just don't look too nervous while you're doing it, OK?