- ‹ previous
- 541 of 2798
- next ›
The New Pentagon
In the Washington Post today, Rajiv Chandrasekaran tells us why Gen. David McKiernan was so abruptly fired a few months ago as the top commander in Afghanistan:
Gates and Mullen had been having doubts about McKiernan since the beginning of the year. They regarded him as too languid, too old-school and too removed from Washington. He lacked the charisma and political savvy that Gen. David H. Petraeus brought to the Iraq war....He did not fawn over visiting lawmakers like Petraeus did in Iraq.
...."Blame General Petraeus," a senior Defense Department official said. "He redefined during his tour in Iraq what it means to be a commanding general. He broke the mold. The traditional responsibilities
were not enough anymore. You had to be adroit at international politics. You had to be a skilled diplomat. You had to be savvy with the press, and you had to be a really sophisticated leader of a large organization. When you judge McKiernan by Petraeus's standards, he looked old-school by comparison."
There's more to the story than just this, and given the importance of the Afghanistan campaign it was hardly unreasonable for Gates and Mullen to install a new commander they thought was better suited to the job — even if this was based primarily on personal chemistry and even if it involved some level of unfairness to an existing commander who hadn't done anything especially wrong. That's just the way it goes with top level executive positions sometimes. What's more, there's evidence in Chandrasekaran's piece that quite a few people in the Pentagon were objectively unimpressed with some of McKiernan's planning, though he's pretty vague about just why that was.
Still, even with all that said, it's a little disturbing that Gates and Mullen apparently placed such a strong emphasis on "charisma and political savvy." That's only a thin line away from "boot licking empty suit," after all, and it wasn't so very long ago that we were complaining that the Army promoted too many politically savvy generals and too few real warriors. That's probably not what happened here — McKiernan's replacement, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has a good reputation — but there's still a slight whiff to the whole thing. And there's also this:
Before McChrystal left Washington, Gates asked him to deliver an assessment of the war in 60 days. Instead of summoning a team of military strategists to Kabul, McChrystal invited Washington think-tank experts from across the ideological spectrum.
....There were few revolutionary ideas in the document, but McChrystal may have received something far more important through the process: allies in the U.S. capital, on the political left and right, to talk about the need for more troops in Afghanistan — in advance of his assessment to Gates, which will probably be submitted this month.
As Spencer Ackerman points out, this is indeed politically savvy. Whether it was the right thing to do is another question entirely.
"A war of necessity"
I assume you've seen or heard President Obama's comments in Phoenix to the VFW claiming Afghanistan is not a war of choice but a "war of necessity".
Okay, Mr Obama. It's your war now.
We apparently re-elected George W Bush, just with more of a tan.
have you heard the news?
That elements of the Taliban have been repulsed, in separate attacks on two Pakistani nuclear weapon storage facilities?
And that ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) is among the agencies responsible for security of WMDs. WMDs, which, due to the nature of the perceived threat from India, are largely located in the more remote areas of Pakistan, where the Taliban and related groups are strongest.
Pakistan is not Aghanistan and the Taliban is not the same in the two countries, but the relationship is deep, and not likely to change voluntarily.
It ain't pretty, and it's far from preferable.
Looks like I and numerous others were right in 2002 and 2003 when we told everyone who would listen that Iraq was a foolish and dangerous distraction, and the window for achieving a good outcome in Afghanistan was short.
We are currently working on achieving the most least-bad outcome we can.
Quelle surprise.
it's not just DC
nation building or stabilizing a country or whatever else you want to call the kind of tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq absolutely require political savvy to get the most out of local allies.
The army has not traditionally had a problem getting Washington on board, so I assume that particular benefit of a more diplomatic commander is incidental and merely more visible to the village. I don't think it's the goal, as far as the military is concerned.
This can't end well.
This can't end well.
Military leaders who
Military leaders who judiciously exercise political judgment are only being smart. Grant, one of the very best officers the U.S. Army has ever produced, always considered the political implications of his plans. When his first attempt at Vicksburg was defeated by raids on his supply lines, Sherman and others told him that the proper military course of action was to retreat to his start point and begin again. Grant conceded the military propriety of this, but answered that he thought that the political situation faced by Lincoln and the national government would not allow for this. He continued with his campaign, which turned out to be one of the key factors in the success of the Union, in no small part because of the political relief its ultimate success afforded Lincoln at a time he needed it badly.
Even more to the point, in order to help Lincoln politically, he kept several less-that-stellar generals with important political connections in the upper Midwest in his command during this campaign for no other reason than to help the President politically, over the sometimes bitter objections of his more competent subordinates. Grant always understood that if he did conduct his operations in a way that took his superiors' difficulties into account, he would be at best less than fully effective and at worst counterproductive.
These issues are delicate in a republic, of course, but the very best military leaders must be capable of handling them. Only time will tell if our current military leaders are in that category.
More to the point ...
He redefined during his tour in Iraq what it means to be a commanding general. He broke the mold.
Seems to me that "mold" looks an awful lot like Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Is this a history deficiency?
A condition driven by an inborn need to paint some story subject in superlatives?
If you read Waging Modern
If you read Waging Modern War, by Wesley Clark, he introduced all these characteristics as important for commanding generals in the media-saturated, alliance heavy context of current generalship. That was his lesson from Kosovo. Ike did it well in an earlier era, too. I think these characteristics are becoming more obviously important, but they are certainly not new.
Are you planning to find
Are you planning to find Cheap UGGS online?UGG has created a new series of UGG Classic Tall Boots which are approximate to the mid-calf.These boots are made of the first-hand sheepskin which touches comfortable but also feels warm.UGG Classic Mini Sale collection is available in limited colors,such as metallic gold and metallic pewter.