Mojo - August 2005

The Public School Gap

Mon Aug. 22, 2005 12:40 PM EDT

Fact-esque points the way to an excellent post by Riggsveda on the U.S. education system, the "No Child Left Behind Act," and the second-hand treatment given to inner city schools:

...despite Bush's much ballyhooed "Texas miracle", the situation seems to have been exacerbated by the kind of apartheid not seen in this country since 1965.

Anyone who lives or works in a big city made up of a diverse racial population can see it. The city schools have become darker and darker, while the suburbs and private schools fill up with white children.
...
In spite of the lip service given to the advance of civil rights issues over the last decades, the demographics of our schools give the lie to our insistence that equal opportunity is a done deal. As a nation we have ignored how schools and neighborhoods have slipped back into the Jim Crow look of the early 20th century, and we pretend that the inequalities between them have no basis in race.


As I live and work on Chicago's South Side, the second-hand status of urban schools is painfully clear. And many Chicagoans will tell you that the real guts of the NCLB is not the emphasis on testing, but the push towards privatization of the public school system. NCLB encourages districts to turn over underperforming schools to private management firms. And in 2004, Chicago's Mayor Daley announced plans to do just that - to close 60 local schools and open 100 new smaller ones (two-thirds of which will be non-union teachers).

At the end of the day, NCLB is actually encouraging the dismantling of the public education system and the first out the door it seems are the students that politicians don't really want to think about.

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Good Ol' Housekeeping...

| Sun Aug. 21, 2005 11:11 PM EDT

Two quick housekeeping notes. First, the good news. Starting Monday you'll see a couple of new faces 'round these parts: I've asked three of my favorite bloggers -- Diane Dees of D.E.D. Space, Charles Norman Todd of Freiheit und Wissen, and Julie Saltman -- to join us here at MoJo Blog for the next few weeks. I'll let them introduce themselves, but suffice to say, they're all fantastic writers and we're excited to have them here at Mother Jones.

The second item is a bit more depressing, at least as far as the content goes. If you haven't seen Kurt Pitzer's story on Iraqi nuclear scientists, now up on our homepage, be sure to give it a read; it's important stuff and a stellar piece of reporting. Way back in 2003, of course, Iraq had only the tiniest scraps of a nuclear program -- certainly nothing worth going to war over. What the country did have, however, was a whole slew of very capable nuclear scientists who, under the right conditions, really could start up a program. Surely in the aftermath of the invasion, then, the Bush administration, being so concerned about Iraq's latent nuclear research program, would have scooped those scientists up and made sure they didn't fall into the wrong hands, right? Er, right? Apparently not, Pitzer found out: "Nobody knows how many Iraqi scientists may have been lured over the borders into Iran, Syria, or beyond. Nobody knows because no one is keeping tabs." Oy. So which adjective in the daily rotation should we use for this occasion: Appalling? Unbelievable? Disastrous? Go with something new, perhaps? I can't decide, but give the article a look.

No Adaption

| Fri Aug. 19, 2005 4:20 PM EDT

In the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jason Vest has an important story on how the U.S. sent its army into Iraq without so much as a counterinsurgency doctrine. "U.S. ground forces are only now beginning to readjust their approach toward counterinsurgency warfare. But to many knowledgeable observers, it's looking like too little, too late--thanks largely to the Pentagon's myopic leadership. It isn't just that the Pentagon's civilian ideologues and acquiescent brass failed to entertain even the possibility of an insurgency. … It's also because, despite a plethora of writing from soldier-scholars and the informal attempts at innovation by a handful of junior officers, no formal organizational strategy exists that allows the army to rapidly and effectively adapt."

VAWA up for Renewal

| Fri Aug. 19, 2005 4:17 PM EDT

Pseudo-Adrienne has a long post on Congress' efforts—or, at points, lack thereof—to reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act. Worth reading. Since the trend among mainstream Democrats of late is to shy away from women's issues—on the ironclad logic that, somehow, alienating half the population is the key to sweet electoral victory—the prospects don't look good. But read her post, and read these two cover stories on domestic violence in the last issue of Mother Jones. And then this post by Jeanne of Body and Soul. All good pieces.

The Case Against Withdrawal

| Fri Aug. 19, 2005 3:31 PM EDT

Matt Yglesias makes the case for a more-or-less timetable-based withdrawal from Iraq. Now before getting too deep into this discussion, let me say, I do think the U.S. should make it clear that eventually, we plan to leave if and when the Iraqi government wants us to leave, and we won't maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Whether Bush is serious about this or not is a good question. As naive as this sounds, I think he could be convinced, although that's a massive leap of faith. Anyway, here's what we know: Since the spring of 2004, the administration has waged a somewhat more "competent" war in Iraq; but, of course, the fallout from mistakes previous has multiplied nearly beyond control. The question now is, stay or go?, and here's the best case I can make against withdrawal. Says Yglesias:

Part of the reason I think it would be good to announce a timetable approximately now is precisely that it could be pegged not to arbitrary dates, but to scheduled elements of the political process, namely a constitution and the election of a permanent government.

This part seems wrong on the merits. True, it's almost a cliché by now, but defeating the Iraqi insurgency requires a political, not a military, solution. Everyone knows that. But let's not delude ourselves: some sort of military solution is also needed. As Anthony Cordesman has outlined in pretty painstaking detail, the insurgency has two components, but they aren't the two components people tend to think—i.e., a bunch of foreign extremists and a homegrown and mostly nationalistic insurgency. No, the homegrown wing has both nationalist and extremist parts, and the extremists continue to multiply, and almost certainly won't stop fighting until they are largely defeated. See Kris Alexander for what "defeated" would mean. This can only be done, I think, by bringing the native Iraqi military and police online, and doing it right, which will take time and patience. (Will Saletan's suggestion that the Iraqi security forces will get motivated real quick if the U.S. starts withdrawing and shoves them into action is, sadly, nonsense, and doesn't merit further discussion.)

In the past—again, up until about the spring of 2004—the training process simply wasn't working, and the Iraqi security forces often ran away from conflicts. All in all, a disaster. But since then, under Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. actually seems to have restructured its training efforts pretty successfully. Iraqi police have now pacified Haifa Street, and have at least maintained a presence in Mosul—no small feat, either of them. American troops can withdraw, or at least become less visible, as this process continues, but not before then. Rushing the training component, or doing it poorly—for instance, by stocking the Army only with Shiite militiamen and Kurdish peshmerga fighters—would be a serious mistake. Without competent security, at this point in time Sunni extremists could very easily a) stage a coup in the parts of the military and police force that they have infilitrated, b) assassinate Iraq's leaders, including Ayatollah Sistani, and c) foment civil war by bombing Shiite shrines and the like. Easy. That's not the only way civil war could come about, granted, but I think it's the most likely, and a U.S. presence is necessary to avert this most-likely scenario until Iraqis can handle it themselves. If that point comes next year, fantastic. If not, then not.

As for the political process, Yglesias makes an important point: If Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds want to fight amongst themselves once the U.S. leaves, nothing in the world can stop them. The U.S. should prepare for this very real possibility. On the other hand, it's not like all sides are so impossibly recalcitrant right now, putting the lie to Yglesias' statement that "[a] s long as we provide them with that safety net, they have no reason to compromise." Some elements of the Shiite coalition, at least, have been willing to make limited concessions to the Sunnis on their own accord. President Jalai Talabani has floated a wide-ranging amnesty for ex-Baathists, and the U.S. should overrule people like anti-amnesty folks like Ahmed Chalabi and encourage Talabani to do so.

As for the constitution: Granted, SCIRI-based Shiites like Abdul-aziz al-Hakim want to break up Iraq and form a Shiite super-province in the south, but in conversation, Andrew Arato has made the case that both Sunni groups and many nationalist and secular Shiites—including, it seems, Ayatollah Sistani—want a unified Iraq. The Kurds, meanwhile, want independence, and it's going to be hard to pressure them to accept anything short of autonomy. All in all, it doesn't look good—some near-intractable problems are at stake here. But unlike Yglesias, I don't entirely see how U.S. troops are "counterproductive to producing a political compromise," which is to say, I don't see all sides somehow becoming more willing to compromise if the U.S. starts drawing down. Again, setting a timetable is different from announcing, repeatedly and forcefully, that we will maintain no long-term presence there—the latter may convince more Sunnis to join the political process. Hopefully. I just don't see how the former will convince Shiites and Kurds to compromise more readily. Deep conflicts don't get resolved simply because the parties involved fear that they might have to go to war. History says otherwise.

More to the point, let's not kid ourselves. If Iraq erupted in full-blown civil war, the U.S. would have to intervene. Our oil addiction demands it. Pretending that we can just leave and wash our hands of the whole mess smacks of naivety. Iraq isn't some insignificant little foothold in the Balkans. I understand that civil war may happen whether the U.S. stays or not. On the other hand, the U.S. will have to micromanage the regional situation whether we start drawing down in 2006 or not. It's a real mess, but it's still real. We don't have much choice. Leaving now, only to be forced to re-invade three or four years down, would be the height of near-sightedness.

So what would I suggest? I'm very much open to persuasion, and much of this involves putting trust in a thoroughly incompetent administration, but my instinct is to go with Cordesman's bevy of small-bore recommendations, including: "Keep reiterating that the US will set no deadlines for withdrawal—or fixed limits on its military effort—and will support Iraq until it is ready to take over the mission and the insurgents are largely defeated." Keep pressure on the government to develop both the proper police forces and governing institutions, which won't likely develop on their own accord. Fix the aid and reconstruction process, which is a nightmare and the one prong of our strategy that continues to founder very badly. Sealing the borders may help, though al-Qaeda seems to be planning to take the fight to Syria next, so sealing the borders up could just accelerate that process. I don't know. Oh, and no more troops will be forthcoming, of course. The U.S. can still "surge" troops for specific needs, by fiddling with the rotation rates or reserves, but a major long-term increase in troops won't happen.

That seems like the rough outline of a realistic "plan," although I obviously can't guarantee it will work, and with this administration, it might be a go-ahead for "more of the same." But, I think, it's more likely to produce stability than pulling out prematurely. Feel free to convince me I'm wrong, because I'd like to be. Though I should also note that, in the event Cordesman's proposal simply can't work, then a withdrawal plus "hoping for the best" actually wouldn't be my second choice; rather, Daniel Byman's bloody-minded "Afghanization" plan for a draw-down seems, horrifically, like the most realistic and "stable" option. Meanwhile, the most important task here at home is to make sure that the crooks and liars who got us into this mess are removed from power as forcefully and quickly as possible. Iraq has been a colossal mistake, of the sort the United States must never make again. That part, at least, needs no debate.

No Hospital For You

| Thu Aug. 18, 2005 3:41 PM EDT

Here's a statistic that may or may not be surprising: The number of hospitals in the United States has been declining over the past six years. (No one quite knows why; presumably because hospitals are consolidating.) But a new study by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation points out something even more disconcerting: the decline of public hospitals has been most rapid in major cities—some 16 percent between 1996 and 2002—especially in areas with both the highest poverty levels and highest rates of the uninsured. Meanwhile, once you start stepping away from the cities, "high-poverty suburbs appear to be relatively underserved by hospitals, compared to low-poverty suburbs, which appear to have an abundance of hospital resources." Not good at all. Everyone harps on getting the uninsured covered; that's an important goal to be sure, but improving access to health care should get just as much attention when thinking about health policy here in the United States.

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Swapping Nightmares

Thu Aug. 18, 2005 1:29 PM EDT

Harold Meyerson rightly fears that that's all the U.S. has accomplished in Iraq. Sure, a brutal dictator was deposed, but now we've brought massive unemployment, violence, set the stage for civil war, and perhaps an Iranian-backed mini-state. But he gets it wrong when he writes:

What neither Bush's critics nor defenders could foresee was his administration's mind-boggling indifference to establishing security in post-Hussein Iraq.

Of course, just yesterday we learned of pre-war State Department memos (which, depending on how you look at it, could be tallied as information from Bush's critics, defenders, or both) warning Central Command that its post-war plans were deficient. A flock of hawks—ex-generals, national security advisors, etc.—warned that planning wasn't being taken seriously. And as Bush worked up the nation for war, there were even those who said that regime change in Iraq wasn't a bad idea per se, but thought it was an awful idea as long as it was carried out by this negligent lot. Lots of people foresaw that post-war planning would be disastrous. And that of course makes the problems today all the more upsetting, and the administrations responsibility all the clearer.

Oh, This is Too Good

Wed Aug. 17, 2005 7:23 PM EDT

Jack Abramoff, before he (yeah, allegedly) made a career out of bilking Native Americans and bribing Senators, was an executive producer for Red Scorpion, a crappy shoot-em-up film. It was a Cold War allegory about a Soviet killing machine sent to fight in Angola, who after seeing the crimes of his adopted army switched sides.

It seems that Abramoff saw the movie as his contribution to amuch larger anti-Communist campaign by Ronald Reagan's "New Right." At the time Abramoff, an ex-Chairman of the College Republicans, was chummy (still is, actually) with anti-government activist Grover Norquist who was giving economic advice to Angola's murderous anti-government rebel group. Go read the Salon article, and see if you can't find a few chuckles amongst the details of a troubled production that likely relied on illegal Apartheid-era South African funding. And if you can take it, watch the theatrical trailer.

Follow the Money

| Wed Aug. 17, 2005 5:34 PM EDT

Dan Kennedy has a great post wondering why journalists won't follow the money when it comes to checking up on industry-funded interest groups. In general, "follow the money" arguments aren't always quite as conclusive as many writers seem to think they are—a given politician, for instance, might be receiving industry money because he or she genuinely believes in X pro-industry position, rather than the reverse—but when a newspaper quotes some group as praising Wal-Mart, and that group happens to be funded by a financial arm of Wal-Mart, um, that seems rather important to note.

Penance for Earthly Sins

Wed Aug. 17, 2005 3:09 PM EDT

A friend recently bought a shiny new ride, and was ecstatic to be ditching her old car and its electrical system headaches. "The only thing I feel bad about," her voice lowering, "is that it's one of those... SUVs." Today Slate profiles a couple of companies that sell some peace of mind to people like her. If you hand over a bit of cash, they'll spend the money in a way that will offset the carbon emissions from your new SUV, house, or vacation air travel. The plans differ. One company, TerraPass, acts like a venture capital fund, providing cash to clean energy or carbon abatement efforts. Another buys up carbon credits at a small green-minded exchange, hopefully taking them off the market.

But consumers already have many good, effective ways of reducing their carbon impact. (Take public transport, buy a smaller house, etc.) While kicking a few dollars towards abatement of the carbon sins of others will help, there are many other tools at our immediate disposal. It's only because the impacts of any single individual's actions to reduce carbon impact are hard to observe that people think this is a solution. Warning, imperfect analogy ahead: If I routinely dump garbage on the street, does an annual check to a highway beautification fund absolve me? Sure, my donation can't hurt, but it ignores my responsibility for the original problem.