Iraq Contracts: Inspectors General Point to Waste and Fraud
Following on my post from last week about the Senate Appropriations Committee's outrage at the scale of waste and fraud...
Following on my post from last week about the Senate Appropriations Committee's outrage at the scale of waste and fraud endemic to Iraq contracts, I offer two specific examples, both disclosed today in separate official audits.
To begin with, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released an audit (.pdf) of a $900-million, cost-plus contract awarded to Parsons Delaware Inc., in March 2004 to design and build infrastructure in support of Iraq's security and justice sectors. This was to include the construction of things like prisons, fire houses, and police stations. As of May 21, 2008, the firm had spent $333 million—of which $142 million (43 percent of the total) was wasted on projects that were never completed. Now, it's easy to point the finger at Parsons. But as SIGIR makes clear, blame also rests with the U.S. government for lack of oversight. Only 10 contract officers, for example, were assigned to the Parson's contract—a project that required about five-to-six times as many. To make matters worse, the audit itself was compromised by inadequate record-keeping by federal agencies. According to the report, SIGIR "contacted a number of responsible contracting offices, but at the conclusion of our review the U.S. government has been unable to locate the files for the contract bid and award process... SIGIR also could not locate inventory records for items purchased by the contractor in support of construction activities."