US Troops Retake the Dragon's Lair
Page 2 of 2
|
|
Seeds for that something were sown in 1998 with a Visiting Forces Agreement, signed by President Clinton, that allowed the US to reenter the Philippines with troops, ships, and gear for military training, humanitarian and engineering projects, and similar missions.
Beyond troop readiness and assistance, as the Pentagon well knows, such operations play a critical strategic role. The relationships they forge with host nations are "our biggest guarantor of access in time of need," noted former Pacific Commander Admiral Thomas Fargo in March 2003. "Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis."
After 2001, America's activity in the archipelago ramped up dramatically. As many as 37 exercises—involving anywhere from a few dozen to as many as 5,000 troops—were scheduled in 2006 alone, up from about 24 during the preceding years, prompting former US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone to describe the US presence as "semi-continuous."
This was no accident: By rotating troop contingents through the region at high frequency, the Pentagon has created a formidable de facto military presence without drawing much public attention. In 2004, Rand military analyst Eric Peltz cited this strategy in congressional testimony as a way to sustain a long-term military position without permanent forward basing.
Further adding to the troop counts, an increasing number of Navy ships have deployed to the Philippines for training and humanitarian missions, although none of this manpower is acknowledged in the Pentagon's periodic troop-strength reports.
The frequent deployments also create openings for the US military to tailor local infrastructure to future needs. In General Santos City, the US constructed a deep-water port and a modern civilian airport, and built one of the country's best roads to connect them. At Fort Magsaysay, where US troops routinely deploy for training, the local airport was renovated and its runway strengthened to handle the weight of C-130 planes. In Basilan and Sulu, also US training venues, the US Agency for International Development has built roads and ports that allow huge ships to make berth.
To top it all off, the Filipino government has stepped up as a key ally in the war on terror, providing US troops with a broad range of support services that enable the Pentagon to sustain its military operations. Following 9/11, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US near-unlimited access to the country's ports and airspace. The following fall, the countries signed a mutual logistics pact that basically makes the Philippines a regional supply hub for the Pentagon. The government has agreed to provide US troops with a wide variety of essential supplies and services ranging from food, water, and fuel to medical services, repair and maintenance, and storage. The pact also covers construction and use of temporary structures. In exchange, the Americans provide ample military aid—an average of nearly $50 million annually since 2002—plus new and used equipment, and political support for the ruling political factions. In short, the American military has managed to finagle a deal in which a foreign government provides all the functions of a conventional base, but without incurring the monetary and political costs of building one.
As an added insurance policy, the Philippines is among the countries where the US is developing lily pads. While the Filipino government has offered no details, military author Robert Kaplan, who has visited various such facilities around the world, provided their general description in The Atlantic Monthly:
"A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens. The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media. The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if we need it."
It is therefore not base size that matters, but whether the host government can be convinced to give the US military what it wants. And sometimes temporary leads to permanent. In 2002, the US deployed to the southern Philippines a unit called the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Initially presented as part of on-again-off-again training exercises, the unit never left, and has quietly built a significant base-support infrastructure, with assistance from US contractors.
This emerging US base lacks the amenities of Subic and Clark. But who needs that when you've got major logistics help, freedom of movement, and permission to preposition gear and build roads, ports, and runways? In addition, most Filipinos remain unaware of the unit's presence and activities. "After more than 10 years," noted armed forces historian C.H. Briscoe, "PACOM has reestablished an acceptable presence in the Philippines."
Thus has the US military managed to position itself closer to an emerging global rival. At no time since 1991 has America been more entrenched. Yet no longer are troops confined by the thousands to huge fortifications; now they deploy by the hundreds all over the islands, bedding down in camps that technically belong to the Philippine military. A soldier stationed here back in the day could expect to stay put for years. Now, the troops must be prepared to ship in and out at short notice. Before, they stored their gear in huge storerooms and warehouses; now it is scattered about in various locations, guarded and maintained by host-nation governments or private companies, and ready to be picked up en route to the fighting.
Through the back door and largely out of sight, the United States has gradually but firmly reintegrated the Philippines into its global posture, effectively reversing that historic decision nearly two decades ago to end nearly a century of US military presence.
Herbert Docena is a Manila-based researcher with Focus on the Global South, an international research and advocacy organization. An earlier version of this article appeared previously in the Filipino press.
While the Pentagon lists just one US military "site" for Kuwait in its 2008 "Base Structure Report," this is clearly inaccurate. In 2005, an expert commission convened by Congress to review US basing strategy detailed three major US outposts here: There's Ali Al Salem Air Base, a support location for the war in Iraq; Camp Arifjan, a major command and intelligence hub specifically built for the US by the Kuwaitis; and Camp Buehring/Udairi Range, which the panel identified as a key staging area for forces en route to Iraq, and a primary training location that can support nearly 40,000 personnel. As noted by William Fallon, a top American commander, the US "cannot imagine operations in Iraq without the vast support of Kuwait."
This article is important in that not only the public of the Philippines know little of the on-again Uncle Sam presence in their country, but this is also news to the American public.
We can only "hope" that the incoming Obama administration is willing and capable to not only bring our troops home from Iraq, but end the Pax Americana worldwide. Only then will American Foreign Policy become benign and permit the funding for urgent domestic programs that benefit our domestic needs.