Political leaders in the Serbian province of Vojvodina come from many ethnic groups, and all of them would like to see their province have more local control. But unlike the Kosovo Albanians today, and ethnic groups from other former provinces such as Bosnia and Croatia, they do not demand independence from Belgrade. That position has had its costs: some of the worst damage wrought by NATO bombs over the past 10 weeks has been in Vojvodina, particularly its capital, Novi Sad.

But the Serbs, who control the local government, nonetheless worry that Vojvodina could become the next breakaway republic. A recent Serbian-language broadcast on Radio France International suggested that Serbia might stand to lose more than just Kosovo, since "extremists in Sandzak and Vojvodina" were looking to break away from Belgrade. The commentary went on to claim that nationalists in neighboring countries -- particularly Hungary and Romania -- were likewise advocating the "plucking of Serbia," noting that more than one million ethnic Romanians live in Vojvodina, as if that were evidence of an imminent separatist threat.

Such speculation that Vojvodina may turn into the next Kosovo is ill-informed, if not downright mischievous. The Belgrade regime has being peddling such rumors to intimidate the region's minority parties and their leaders, and perhaps to head off any potential rebellions.

The flat and arable region of Vojvodina, which lies just north of Belgrade, is a stronghold of the Serbian opposition and is populated by a mix of ethnic Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and others, including Serbs. While both regions enjoyed autonomy under President Josip Broz Tito, comparisons between Vojvodina and Kosovo can be taken too far. Unlike in Kosovo, Serbians are not a minority group in Vojvodina and ethnic minorities do not dominate in numbers the way they do in Kosovo. Moreover, there is a great economic disparity between the two regions. Vojvodina is the most prosperous area of Yugoslavia; Kosovo, the poorest.

Contrary to the report by Radio France, the latest census (in 1991), shows that fewer than 39,800 Romanians -- or about two percent of the region's total population of two million -- live in Vojvodina. No Romanian political parties have ever suggested that they make territorial claims toward Serbia. The same applies to the parties in Hungary, whose national minority in Vojvodina, according to the same census, comprises 340,000 people.

None of the political parties in Vojvodina have exhibited separatist tendencies. While they do have their own unique views and concerns regarding the kind of autonomy they wish to see granted, no party has taken issue with the position of Vojvodina within the state of Serbia.

Claims that there are extremists in Vojvodina who now see the chance to "pluck" Serbia naked are not only inaccurate, but dangerous for those of the population who are members of the 16 recognized national minorities. Such claims are even more hazardous for the people who are politically active in these parties and who have been advocating a return to the level of autonomy the province enjoyed prior to a "patriotic" change in September 1990.

Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and deputy prime minister in the Serbian government, recently said that the "conditions have been created for the arrest of Nenad Canak," the leader of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV). Canak is one of the most prominent advocates of autonomy and has already been labeled a traitor by the pro-Serb media.

Just two weeks before the start of the NATO campaign, Canak published an LSV policy document that called for a change in the Serbian constitution and a redefinition of the "politically and economically unsustainable status of Vojvodina."

Canak's statement advocated a "federalization" of Serbia, composed of the individual federal units of Vojvodina, Sumadija, Southeastern Serbia, the city of Belgrade and its surroundings, Sandzak or the Raska region, and Kosovo. Such a federalist restructuring should, Canak continued, designate Vojvodina as the central republic of Serbia.

While it has the most radical demands, the LSV is not alone in its desire to redefine the current constitutional position of Vojvodina. Serbian and Hungarian political parties in the region are also calling for the decentralization and democratization of Serbia. But no one is calling for absolute independence.

Since Vojvodinan parties disagree over the level of autonomy they should enjoy and the relative status of individual minorities, there is no agreement on how autonomy can realistically be achieved. These issues have polarized the political forces and led to the creation of party alliances -- though, surprisingly enough, these do not follow ethnic lines.

Last year the biggest Hungarian party, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, published a paper that proposed precisely defined rights for the national minorities, including the recognition of Hungarian as an official language and the right to be educated in Hungarian. A number of parties lent their support to the document. But, like similar proposals by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, it was ignored by the Belgrade authorities.

In recent years, the pro-regime media has often compared Kosovo with Vojvodina, citing the latter as an example of inter-ethnic tolerance and cooperation that Kosovo Albanians would do well to follow. While the picture of ethnic harmony and equality was not entirely accurate, Belgrade regularly stressed that national minorities in Vojvodina enjoyed minority rights at the highest European standards.

Yet according to one empirical study published by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, the chiefs of police in all 45 municipalities in Vojvodina are either Serbs or Montenegrins. The majority of policemen are likewise Serbs and Montenegrins. So, too, it was found, for the presidents of the courts, banks, and businesses -- even in the municipalities where ethnic Hungarians are the majority population.