Last night I mentioned in passing the conventional wisdom that it will take five years or more to train the Afghan army up to a point where it can successfully take over counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban. Why so long? BruceR, who recently returned from a tour in Afghanistan, provides an answer:
1. Building anew is harder than renovating.
2. Multinational coalitions are inherently less efficient at army building.
3. Force protection measures in a warzone limit mentoring.
4. We still have limited experience with the culture at our command levels.
5. Giving someone independence before you give them an army limits what you can do later.
6. Growing in size and in quality at the same time is hard.
7. Risk aversion: in some ways, we’ve taught them too well.
Details are at the link. He also says this: “At some point in this game, saying something takes a long time is going to be the equivalent of saying it’s impossible. [Italics mine.] And raising an army in a country where security is this uncertain may well be impossible for us….If any army with a piece of the Afghan puzzle has cracked the nut with their unique approach, I haven’t heard it. If we ever do, the force of effort now being applied could rapidly gain traction, I have no doubt. But we’re certainly not at a point that we have a solution and we’re unable to implement it: I would suggest we simply don’t have the whole solution yet.”
Well, our top commanders in Afghanistan say they figure they have 12-18 months to figure this out. If Bruce is right, that’s pretty close to impossible. Which means that in 12-18 months they’ll be back asking for another 12-18 months. (And more troops.) And then another 12-18 months. (And more troops.) We might want to think about getting off this train now instead.
