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Why Superdelegates Are a Mob

What happens to the Democratic primary when you plug it into the Prisoner's Dilemma? You know, that classic game theory tool (born from mathematics and economics and now used across many disciplines to analyze optimal behavior strategies when the outcome is uncertain and is dependent on the choices of others). Well, you might think superdelegates are good. You might think they're bad. But according to polysciblogger Jay Cost at RealClearPolitics the outcome is essentially anarchy:

The core problem is that the Democrats have empowered the super delegates to break a tie, but they have not empowered anybody to manage the super delegates. There are no rules that demand the super delegates convene and discuss with one another. There is nobody in charge of regulating the debate. There is nothing to punish the super delegates who are small-minded, nothing to reward the big-minded. There are no time restrictions that require them to make up their minds prior to the convention. They are wholly unfettered. Thus, the super delegates have a great deal in common with a mob. They're a mob of experienced, qualified politicos who care about the party. If the Democratic Party were to be put at the mercy of a mob—this is the mob you'd want. But it is a mob nonetheless. This is why large institutions—like the House and the Senate—have reams of rules governing member behavior. If the members of those institutions are to do their jobs ably, they need a framework for interaction. Otherwise, their talents may be squandered amidst the chaos.

Squandered talents. Amidst the chaos. Sounds like Normal to me… Thanks to Jake Young blogging at Pure Pedantry for pointing the way on this.

Julia Whitty is Mother Jones' environmental correspondent, lecturer, and 2008 winner of the John Burroughs Medal Award. You can read from her new book, The Fragile Edge, and other writings, here.

Comments

The prisoner's dilema and the dilema of collective action (what the RCP article is discussing) are very much not the same thing.

Posted by: Sam Boyd on 03/03/08 at 11:18 PM Respond

To be clear, I'm talking about the RCP article in the sense of not distinguishing between the two dilemas. It's kindof a trainwreck, actually. You can't just blithely generalize like that...

Posted by: Sam Boyd on 03/03/08 at 11:25 PM Respond

Generalize from a two player game to a many player one that is. I'm tired.

Posted by: Sam Boyd on 03/03/08 at 11:26 PM Respond

Sam is right. The prisoner's dilemma is a game where there are two players, each with two choices: to cooperate (in the prisoner example, stay quiet) or screw the other (in the prisoner case, squeal). If both stay quiet, each gets the best outcome (going free). If one squeals and the other stays quiet, the squealer gets 2 years for talking and the other gets 6 years. If they both squeal, they both get 4 years. The problem is that neither knows what the other is doing.

Obviously the best outcome is for both to stay quiet, but you do not want to stay quiet if the other squeals (because they get the most time), so both usually squeal, which is not the best outcome for the prisoners (total of 8 years in prison instead of none).

In the delegate case, the delegates do not benefit or are harmed personally. Also, they do have information on the acts of others; it is plastered all over the television and internet.

If anything this is the countermajoritarian difficulty.

Posted by: TarGator on 03/04/08 at 3:03 AM Respond

Aside from mixing your metaphors, there is another problem with this.
It assumes that any democratic/representative based governing body needs supervsision to run correctly.

"Democracy is a a device that ensures we will be governed no better than we deserve." -g.b.shaw

Posted by: cboas on 03/04/08 at 7:28 AM Respond