GAO Report Now Available: Iraqi Gov’t Meets 3 of 18 Benchmarks


The GAO report on the Iraqi government is out (background here). Key results: At the end of August, the Iraqi government had met three, had partially met four, and had not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks.

Benchmarks met:

  • Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.
  • Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
  • Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

Benchmarks partially met:

  • Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.
  • Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
  • Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said ”the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”
  • Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

Benchmarks not met:

  • Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.
  • Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification.
  • Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
  • Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
  • Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
  • Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.
  • Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
  • Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.
  • Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.
  • Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces’ units capable of operating independently.
  • Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.