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Can the US and China Coexist in Africa?

A rivalry between the two powers can only bring trouble for Africans.

| Thu Jul. 31, 2014 5:10 PM EDT

This mass influx of Chinese pioneers has bred resentment in some quarters, as have heavy-handed tactics by Chinese companies that often ignore local labor laws and environmental regulations, freeze out local workers, mistreat them, or pay them exceptionally low wages. This, in turn, has led to instances of violence against Africa's Chinese, as has Beijing's support for unpopular and repressive governments on the continent. Such threats to the safety of Chinese citizens and business interests, as well as general political instability and armed conflicts—from Libya to South Sudan—have given China still another reason to build-up its presence.

Traditionally, Beijing has adhered to a non-interference, "no strings attached" foreign policy—meaning no requirements on partner nations in terms of transparency, corruption, environmental protection, human rights, or good governance—and, as opposed to the United States, has avoided overseas military inventions. While it has long contributed to U.N. peacekeeping operations—the only kind of foreign intervention Beijing considers legitimate—China has generally operated far from the front lines. But things are subtly shifting on this score.

In 2011, after the US-backed revolution in Libya imperiled 30,000 Chinese living there, the People's Liberation Army coordinated air and sea assets in the largest evacuation mission in its history. And as the war in Libya destabilized neighboring Mali and a US-trained officer overthrew that country's elected president, China sent combat troops—for the first time in its history—to join U.N. forces in a bid to stabilize a nation that the US had spent a decade bolstering through counterterrorism funding.

Then, when US-backed South Sudan slid into civil war late last year—and 300 Chinese workers had to be evacuated—Beijing departed from the hands-off approach it had taken only a few years earlier with Sudan, ramped up diplomatic efforts and pushed hard for peace talks. "This is something new for us," said China's special envoy to Africa, Zhong Jianhua. This was, he noted, the beginning of a "new chapter" in policies by which China would now "do more [in terms of] peace and security for this continent."

More recently, Beijing managed to broker an unprecedented arrangement to expand the mandate of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan. In addition to "protection of civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance," according to Foreign Policy, "Beijing quietly secured a deal that will put the U.N.'s famed blue helmets to work protecting workers in South Sudan's oil installations, where China has invested billions of dollars." Although protecting the oil fields is akin to taking the government's side in a civil war, the US, France, and Great Britain backed the plan to protect oil installations under a U.N. mandate, citing the importance of the energy sector to the future of the country. In return, China will send an 850-man infantry battalion to bolster the U.N. mission, adding to the 350 military personnel it already had on the ground here.

When it comes to protecting their infrastructure, "the Chinese have gotten very good at deploying peacekeeping forces," Patricia Taft, a senior associate with the Fund for Peace, tells TomDispatch. "The Chinese have, in East Africa and also West Africa, inserted themselves as a security presence, mainly to protect their oil interests, their infrastructure, or whatever economic projects they're deeply invested in."

Yun Sun, a fellow at the Stimson Center and an expert on China's relations with Africa, doesn't see these recent developments as a militarization of China's mission, but as a symptom of increased investment in the countries of the continent. "China cares more about security issues in Africa… due to its own national interests," Sun tells TomDispatch. "It means China will contribute more to the peace and security issues of the continent." And it seems that Beijing is now doing so, in part on America's dime.

Winners and Losers

US taxpayers, who fund about 27% percent of the cost of United Nations peacekeeping missions, are now effectively underwriting China's efforts to protect its oil interests in South Sudan. Washington continues to pour aid into that country—more than $456 million in humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2014—while China has pledged far less in humanitarian relief. Meanwhile, Juba has tied itself ever more tightly to Chinese energy interests, with plans to borrow more than $1 billion from oil companies to keep the government afloat as it battles the rebels.

Taft sees these deals with largely Chinese firms as both risky for South Sudan's future and potentially ineffective as well. "It's putting a band-aid on a hemorrhaging artery," she says. David Deng, research director for the South Sudan Law Society, echoes this: "We're mortgaging our children's future to fight a pointless war."

South Sudan seems emblematic of a larger trend in the race between Washington and Beijing in Africa. In 2000, China's trade there passed $10 billion for the first time and has been growing at a 30% clip annually ever since. Nine years later, China overtook the US to become the continent's largest trading partner and, by 2012, its trade was nearly double that of the US—$198.5 billion to $99.8 billion. While the United States recently announced that $900 million in unspecified "deals" with Africa will be unveiled at an upcoming US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, it will nonetheless continue to trail far behind China in terms of trade on the continent.

For the Chinese, Africa is El Dorado, a land of opportunity for one million migrants. For America, it's a collection of "ungoverned spaces," "austere locations," and failing states increasingly dominated by local terror groups poised to become global threats, a danger zone to be militarily managed through special operators and proxy armies. "In Africa, terrorists, criminal organizations, militias, corrupt officials, and pirates continue to exploit ungoverned and under-governed territory on the continent and its surrounding waters," reads the Pentagon's 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). "The potential for rapidly developing threats, particularly in fragile states, including violent public protests and terrorist attacks, could pose acute challenges to US interests."

"Recent engagements in Somalia and Mali, in which African countries and regional organizations are working together with international partners in Europe and the United States, may provide a model for future partnerships," adds the QDR. But a look at those poster-child nations for US involvement—one in East and one in West Africa—instead provides evidence of America's failings on the continent.

In 2006, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), a loose confederation of indigenous Islamist groups seeking to impose order on the failed state of Somalia, defeated the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, a US-supported militia, and pushed the US-backed warlords out of Mogadishu, the capital. In response, the United States green-lighted a 2007 invasion of the country by Ethiopia's military and secretly sent in a small contingent of its own troops (still operating in Somalia to this day). This succeeded only in splintering the ICU, sending its moderates into exile, while its hardliners formed a far more extreme Islamic group, al-Shabab, which became the key Muslim resistance force against al-Shabab, Washington's Ethiopian proxies.

Al-Shabab experienced a great deal of military success before being beaten back by the Ethiopians, troops from a US-supported Somali transitional government, and well-armed peacekeepers from the US-backed African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). These forces were, from 2009 onward, joined by proxies trained and armed by US-ally Kenya, whose own army invaded the country in 2011. Their forces in Somalia, eventually folded into the AMISOM mission, are still deployed there. On the run and outgunned, al-Shabab responded by threatening to take the war beyond its borders and soon began to do so.

In other words, what started as a local Islamic group achieving, according to a Chatham House report, "the unthinkable, uniting Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years, and reestablishing peace and security," quickly became a transnational terror organization in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion and other acts of intervention. In 2010, al-Shabab carried out a bomb attack in Uganda as a punishment for that country's contribution to the African Union mission in Somalia. In 2011, it launched an escalating series of shootings, grenade attacks, and bombings in Kenya. The next year, the formerly Somalia-centric outfit further internationalized its efforts as one of its leaders pledged obedience to al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2013, the group carried out a devastating attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya that killed 67.

Earlier this year, al-Shabab extended its reach even further with its first-ever suicide attack in Djibouti, the tiny Horn of Africa nation that contributes troops to AMISOM and hosts French troops, a key European proxy force for Washington on the continent, as well as the only avowed US base in Africa. "The attack was carried out against the French Crusaders for their complicity in the massacres and persecution of our Muslim brothers in the Central African Republic and for their active role in training and equipping the apostate Djiboutian troops in Somalia," read an al-Shabab statement that also highlighted a US-backed French military mission in the Central African Republic.

In the months since, the group has repeatedly launched murderous assaults on civilians in Kenya and continues to threaten Uganda and Burundi, which also contributes troops to AMISOM, with future attacks. It has even gained regional affiliates, like Al-Hijra, an underground group accused of recruiting for al-Shabab in Kenya.

After 9/11, on the opposite side of the continent, US programs like the Pan-Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into training and arming the militaries of Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Algeria, and Tunisia, again in order to promote regional "stability." While US Special Operations forces were teaching infantry tactics to Malian troops, the Chinese were engaging very differently with that West African nation. Despite Mali's lack of natural resources, China constructed a key bridge, a hospital, a stadium, a major government building, several factories, miles of highways, and a $230 million waterworks project.

The US wasn't, however, left totally out in the cold on the construction front. The State Department's Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), for example, spent $71.6 million to expand the Bamako Airport. The contract, however, went to a Chinese firm—as did many MCC contracts across Africa—because American companies were uninterested in working there despite guaranteed US financing.

What Washington was trying to build in Mali came crashing down, however, after the US helped topple Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, causing that country to collapse into a morass of militia fiefdoms. Nomadic Tuareg fighters looted the weapons stores of the Gaddafi regime they had previously served, crossed the border, routed US-backed Malian forces and seized the northern part of the country. This, in turn, prompted a US-trained officer to stage a military coup in the Malian capital, Bamako, and oust the democratically elected president.

Soon after, the Tuareg rebels were muscled aside by heavily-armed Islamist rebels who began taking over the country. This, in turn, prompted the US to back a 2013 invasion by French and African forces which arrested the complete collapse of Mali—leaving it in a permanent state of occupation and low-level insurgency. Meanwhile, Islamist fighters and Gaddafi's weapons were scattered across Africa, contributing to greater instability in Nigeria and Libya, as well as increased threat levels in Chad, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. It evidently also spurred an audacious revenge attack in Algeria that left more than 80 dead and an assault on a French-run uranium mine and a nearby military base in Niger in which at least 25 people were killed.

Two Systems, One Continent

In 2000, a report prepared under the auspices of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute examined the "African security environment." While it touched on "internal separatist or rebel movements" in "weak states," as well as non-state actors like militias and "warlord armies," there is conspicuously no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats. Following the 9/11 attacks, a senior Pentagon official claimed that the US invasion of Afghanistan might drive "terrorists" out of that country and into African nations, but when pressed about actual transnational dangers on that continent, he admitted that even hardcore Somali militants "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia."

Despite this, Washington dispatched personnel to Africa in 2002 and began pouring money into counterterrorism efforts. Since then, the US has steadily increased its military footprint, its troop levels, and its missions on the continent—from night raids in Somalia and kidnap operations in Libya to the construction of a string of bases devoted to surveillance activities across the northern tier of Africa.

For all the time spent training proxies, all the propaganda efforts, all the black ops missions, all the counterterror funds, the results have been dismal. A glance at the official State Department list of terrorist organizations indicates that these efforts have been mirrored by the growth of radical militant groups, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group added in 2004, al-Shabab in 2008, Ansar al-Dine, Boko Haram, Ansaru, and the al-Mulathamun Battalion in 2013, and Libya's Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi, and Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah, as well as Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia, and the Egyptian militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, all in 2014. And that's hardly a full list. Not included are various terror organizations, rebel forces, separatist movements, armed groups, and militias like the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, fighters from the group formerly known as Seleka and their rivals, anti-balaka militiamen in the Central African Republic, Taureg separatists of Mali's National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the Congolese Resistance Patriots, Burundi's National Forces of Liberation, and others.

Over these years, as the US has chased terror groups and watched them proliferate, China has taken another route, devoting its efforts to building goodwill through public works and winning over governments through "no strings attached" policies.

"Our goal is not to counter China; our goal is not to contain China," President Obama said during a trip to Asia earlier this year. In South Sudan, as in Africa as a whole, America seems increasingly unable to even keep up. "On certain levels, we can't or won't compete with China," says the Fund for Peace's Patricia Taft. "China will continue to eclipse us in terms of economic interests in Africa." The US is, however, still preeminent in the political sphere and that influence, she says, will continue to trump anything China can currently offer.

The question is: For how long?

Cameron Hudson, formerly of the National Security Council and now the acting director of the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Museum, thinks strengthening partnerships with the Chinese could lead to major dividends for the United States. "They have more skin in the game," he says of Beijing's relationship with South Sudan. "They have a growing set of interests there."

Benediste Hoareau, head of political affairs for the East African Standby Force—a rapid intervention force in-the-making, consisting of troops from the region's militaries—expresses similar sentiments. He believes in the often repeated axiom of finding African solutions to African problems and says that the foreign powers should provide the funds and let African forces do the fighting and peacekeeping in South Sudan.

Hoareau, in fact, sees no need for a contest, new Cold War or otherwise, between the foreign titans here. There are plenty of opportunities for both the United States and China in Africa and in South Sudan, he tells TomDispatch. A rivalry between the two powers can only bring trouble. "They're elephants," Hoareau says of China and America, "and you know just who will get trampled."

Nick Turse is the managing editor of and a fellow at the Nation Institute. A 2014 Izzy Award winner, he has reported from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa and his pieces have appeared in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch.This story was reported in partnership with the Investigative Fund at the Nation Institute. Additional funding was provided through the generosity of Adelaide Gomer. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from here.

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