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Karzai Revisited
Matt Yglesias pushes back today on my contention that a counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan is probably doomed unless the national government is largely accepted as legitimate by the Afghan public. He's not in favor of a big COIN effort, but:
At the same time, I think [] critics have developed a tendency to drastically understate the extent to which COIN could “work” in Afghanistan.
....I went and looked up the most corrupt countries on earth at Transparency International and [...] Afghanistan, as you can see, is pretty corrupt. That said, it’s not really far out of line with local norms. Sundry other central Asian states join it at the bottom of the barrel. And while it’s true that some of the most corrupt countries are anarchic failed states, the examples of Myanmar and Turkmenistan clearly indicate that establishing effective control over your territory doesn’t at all require you to develop good governance or be respected by the people.
Well, sure, but I don't think anyone is arguing that corrupt states can't be effective. The difference, though, is that a foreign superpower isn't fighting a war in any of those other places. That's the issue: not whether corrupt states can "work," but whether a foreign army can successfully fight an insurgency when it's allied with a government that has little local support. In fact, the success of the surge in Iraq, which Matt mentions, is precisely due to the fact that, corrupt or not, Nouri al-Maliki's government had built up a shaky but workable coalition among Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis. It wasn't exactly a shining beacon of good governance, but a combination of bribery, al-Qaeda overreach, sectarian cleansing, and a ceasefire from the biggest opposition group opened up just enough space for a counterinsurgency operation to work. Without at least that minimal level of support for the Maliki government, the surge almost certainly would have failed.
In the modern era, as far as I know, the track record of success for counterinsurgencies led by foreign powers fighting alongside unpopular local governments is approximately zero. In fact, I'm pretty sure it's exactly zero. So the question isn't whether Karzai is corrupt — of course he is — the question is how wide his support is. That's actually a bit of a tricky question, especially in the fractious tribal politics of Afghanistan, but it's the question to ask. Corruption is just a symptom, not the core problem.
Is anybody listening?
What are they saying about Karzai in Pashtunistan? Both West Pashtunistan and East Pashtunistan?
COIN of Whose Realm?
In the modern era, as far as I know, the track record of success for counterinsurgencies led by foreign powers fighting alongside unpopular local governments is approximately zero.
Unpopularity of the local government is just one of the problems with counterinsurgency, both in theory and in practice.
To start with, you have the foreign powers leading the counterinsurgency while fighting alongside the local government. The statement's confusion regarding who's in charge reflects the confusion on the ground.
Were foreign counterinsurgency operations more successful in the premodern era? Is extermination the archetype of successful counterinsurgency?
When is it ever legitimate for a foreign power to lead a counterinsurgency? When is it legitimate for US forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations beyond our borders?
Against what are the insurgents rebelling? How can the foreign forces be sure that it's their local allies, and not themselves, who are the force that calls forth the insurgency?
Whether the local government is popular or not, when is foreign intervention against insurgents (who are not invaders) legitimate?
Whose interests are served by the foreign counterinsurgents?
How do you measure success, and how long does it last?
In answer to most of your questions
Prosecuting a counter insurgency effort in a foreign land is a situation that arises exclusively from the crime of waging aggressive war. Indeed, the atrocities endemic in any such effort are precisely the reason aggressive war is prohibited. Is it ever legitimate to pursue COIN in a foreign land? In a word, NO. If you find yourself doing such a thing, you find yourself in a position of being legally obligated to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from that foreign land.
North Korea redux?
Should our goal be establishing a government that can exercise total control over the populace? One that successfully puts down internal dissent and insurrection it deems dangerous to governance? Would the U.S. deem its work done if Afghanistan resembled North Korea? It "works" as far as being free of many of the troubles we're striving to eliminate in Afghanistan. There aren't car bombs leveling buildings, raging opiate harvesting operations, weddings and festivals getting the hell bombed out of them from the air, terrorist training camps spewing forth jihadists bent on killing Americans and all manner of other peril we'd like to be rid of. Just how much of a moderately safe yet human rights hellhole are we prepared to be happy with if that means figuring out a way to make it happen?
A side effect of mission
A side effect of mission creep is that people forget the original goals. Is Iraq a shining city on the hill that has inspired the people of the Middle East to rise up and demand democracy? Not really. A stupid idea in the first place. If Turkey didn't do the job of providing an example, why would Iraq? Actually fundamentalism seems to be taking hold in Turkey. Iraq is probably much more unstable than it was under Saddam. Seems like where there are serious ethnic conflicts a dictator must be supplanted by more or less permanent military occupation for stability. We'll see what happens when we're out. I see no advantage to our country. Anti-Americanism will probably be rampant due to the destruction and death wrought by Bush, something not relevant under Saddam. Terrorist cells will flourish without the tight control of a Saddam. Governments reflect the culture of the people, and as Iraq is about the most corrupt country on earth, the government will quickly revert to corrupt strongman or one party rule. Iraq was a victory for the neocons, as an enemy of israel was knocked out without shedding any Israeli blood, but pretty much a negative for the US in the long run. So if the surge was a success, Iraq will probably prove to be a failure for US interests.
A counterinsurgency would no doubt work in Afghanistan if we put enough resources in. Shinseki was probably accurate in estimating that it takes several hundred thousand soldiers to secure a country the size of Iraq or Afghanistan. You can put 'em all in at once, or stretch it out over a long period and just maintain enough force to train an Afghan force and stabilize the government.
The trouble with Afghanistan is that we are not just fighting a counterinsurgency, but a culture war and a drug war at the same time, while allowing sanctuaries in Pakistan. While Bush was a religious conservative, he was also a PC lib on such things as feminism and affirmative action, and generally carried the PC baggage of being unable to understand and tolerate other cultures. PC libs are as intolerant as any other fundamentalist group, so different cultural practices like not educating women and not electing women or wearing burqas are anathema to them. Thus Bush declared cultural war on Afghanistan, quadrupling the difficulty of coming to an accommodation with conservative elements of Afghan society and the Taliban, by forcing them to elect women, building schools, etc. Off and on anti-drug policies further alienate much of Afghan society, tribal leaders, and corruptocrats (which are the norm).
Afghan is doable, but at great cost, and it is questionable if any US interests are involved.
Spot on.
Spot on.
Talk about losing sight of original goals
Our original goal was to reestablish our national security. This was the only possible legitimate goal, and it was the only legitimate goal ever offered for either Afghanistan or Iraq. It is an obvious lie. The world's sole superpower has no need to invade and occupyt for years sovereign nations on the other side of the globe that never attacked us for the purpose of self defense. Even if those nations had attacked us, it wouldn't come remotely close to providing a legal justification for our response. IT IS NONE OF OUR GODDAMNED BUSINESS IF IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN HAVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS. We have never had a legitimate right or reason to be in either country. Most of you people are arguing back and forth over the most efficacious way to prosecute a criminal war of aggression. Doing so is the act of an evil pig deserving of an eternity in Hell. Stop it.
Really solid post, Luther.
tagged as:- solution
A few suggestions:
Option 1: Go All-In.
Luther very rightly says, "A counterinsurgency would no doubt work in Afghanistan if we put enough resources in. Shinseki was probably accurate in estimating that it takes several hundred thousand soldiers to secure a country the size of Iraq or Afghanistan. You can put 'em all in at once, or stretch it out over a long period and just maintain enough force to train an Afghan force and stabilize the government."
What about it? What about going full Powell-doctrine and actually stabilizing the place? It would cost a frickin' FORTUNE, and as Luther also rightly notes, the returns are minimal, if even detectable. But you would manage to put a stable country on Pakistan's border, and who knows, you might even get lucky and catch a few AQ guys. Best of all, we could go home sooner.
OK, so this sounds like a pipe-dream. It ain't gonna happen. I'm not even sure if we have the manpower to do it if we wanted to. But a short war is, to my mind, more morally defensible than a long, badly-fought one.
Option 2: On The (Seemingly) Cheap.
Again with the Luther: "...stretch it out over a long period and just maintain enough force to train an Afghan force and stabilize the government."
It's not actually cheaper, and probably much less effective. The best you could hope to achieve is a tamping down of the worst of the violence while picking off a few AQ and Taliban middle-management types. More likely, we just spin our wheels for another god-knows-how-long until some politician finds it expedient to promise to get us out.
I think this is the most likely scenario. Also the most depressing.
Option 3: Leave. Now.
Declare the Karzai government not worth supporting, pack our bags and go. The downside really does exist - an empowered Taliban sending Afghanistan back to the 9th Century; AQ operating more freely, and worst of all, the prospect of an empowered American Taliban, i.e. the GOP having a cudgel in its hand. Plus, we'd have less intel on the tribal areas of Pakistan than we do now. Sure, we'd keep some SOCOM guys there, but those guys, left alone, are basically in the killing business, not the hearts-and-minds business. On the bright side, we'd save billions, the world wouldn't actually end, and we'd have military resources available for wherever else they might be needed.
This is a really sucky choice. But better than #2. Also, less likely.
Option 4: Welcome To The Opium Trade
Someone tell me why this won't work: Buy. Every. Single. Poppy. In Afghanistan. Set up (heavily guarded) poppy brokerages in strategic locations around the country. Overpay for poppy. Sell what you can to the pharma companies; burn the rest. Here's how I see that helping:
A) The Karzai government is corrupt? Guess what - we just took away their means of corruption! The only ones who'll stay will be the ones interested in actually governing.
B) We just stole the Taliban's wallet. Do they have other sources of funding? Sure. But this is a big one. It would be hitting them where it really hurts.
C) Obviously, the Taliban would do everything in their power to keep farmers from dealing with us. But that would quite likely involve attacking us in the places where we buy the poppy. As in - on the battlefield of our choosing, not theirs. We'd draw them out - probably en masse - and call the proverbial tune. As opposed to the way things are now. Ordinarily, defending a fixed position isn't really the position you want to be in. But we have B-52's.
D) We'd actually impact the global heroin trade, at least for a short while. Of course it would move elsewhere. But for a while, I bet there'd be a noticeable impact.
E) It's way WAY cheaper than the other three options.
Couldn't this work? I know it's nutty - but it isn't nearly as nutty as everything else I'm hearing. What say you?
Score the Surge
Was the Surge actually a 'success'? I asked this question at Angry Bear and didn't get a solid answer. Mainly because I asked for a specific metric. Yes violence is down from what it was at the height of the insurgency but by that metric Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg was a success. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pickett's_Charge I mean after all four months after Longstreet ordered Pickett up that hill the battlefield was quiet enough that the President of the U.S. was able to give an open air speech. Of course PIckett's Charge also marked the turning point in the Civil War against the Confederates, but you know a couple of years later nobody was firing cannons. Not much comfort to those kids who charged the hill.
Could Bush have gotten the same deal in 2005 as the one which was forced on him in 2008 by Maliki? If Bush had offered the Sunni's and the Sadrists alike that all combat troops would be out of the cities of Anbar and South Iraq in eighteen months and out of the country in thirty-six would we have even needed the Surge? Well who knows, but I don't think those of us who resisted the Surge have been shown to be quite the chuckleheads that Yglesias's formulation would have it. Because the Surge wasn't a big success for the roughly 1000 GIs that died during its course.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm
If you look at the chart you can see that every spike in U.S. casualties was the result of the U.S. embarking on a new offensive aimed at reducing resistance to the central government. Instead the end-game after the surge was simply to accept the demands of the Sunnis and the Sadrists that we decided to attack in late 2003 and during 2004.
I'll freely accept that Gates was a huge improvement over Rumsfeld, but to call the results of his efforts anything more than a totally relative success is to surrender too much rhetorical ground to the war-mongers. Especially as McCain is using the 'success' of the Surge to argue for doubling down in Afghanistan.
Can we measure success per dead US soldier or Iraqi civilian? Or maybe per billion dollars of expenditure?
What to do about it
tagged as:- solution
Kevin, it isn't that hard to analyze: Wall Street can get away with that because the government, not even Obama, pushes back against them hard enough. The worst of the crowd on Capital Hill (not all Republicans by far) aren't just flabby but active conspirators in making it worse. You do realize this, as per acknowledgment of the power of the Money Lobby/Party.
We have to push back real hard, and press for reforms. You've heard of the usual regulatory ones, but a sales tax on all financial trades would really bring the bubbles down to earth, and fast.
Sorry, I jumped to the wrong
Sorry, I jumped to the wrong thread .... sadly I have no proposed solution for Afghanistan!
Now playing: a remake of a bad film
Having perused several of KD's Afghanistan-related posts and associated comment threads, I have to agree with what Pat Lang wrote recently on his blog:
"The basic contest over policy in Afghanistan is between those who insist that to reduce the Islamist danger to the USA, Afghanistan must be made into something fundamentally different than what it has been (the counterinsurgents) and those others who think (like Biden) that something less ambitious will accomplish the same thing."
There are many similarities between the current discussion and the debates that took place in the run-up to Iraq War II, or at least it seems that way to me.
Afghanistan
Let's send another 45,000 of our kids into this hellhole, help to prop up this corrupt piece of shit government and grow some more flowers so there will be plenty to plant when the body bags get back. Great Plan !
Well, No Wonder...
some people get upset when the US acts. Take leafsong2's idiotic formulation and nearly any action is illlegal if it is opposed.
"If you find yourself doing such a thing (pursuing COIN in a foreign land), you find yourself in a position of being legally obligated to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from that foreign land."
Note how this handily takes all questions about provocation, legitimacy, other outside influences, and the will of the people out of the equation. According to leafsong2, you're wrong simply by being in another country if there is any insurgent opposition at all, even if they are a small fraction of the population and are doing the bidding of another foreign entity. Of course, this idea is apparently predicated on the mistaken assumption that any offensive action is agression, which is not true.
Still, what a handy rule for the non-participant. No thought required, much less judgment and responsibility. Nice.
Hey, we had a looser standard
It was in the UN Charter. Eight years later, we're still in two aggressive wars. If you are in a foreign country for some other reason then NECESSARY self defense, and if you haven't been invited into that country AND authorized to intervene for humanitarian purposes by the UNSC, you have committed one of the most heinous crimes the Human Race has ever bothered to prohibit: aggressive war. Provocation, legitimacy, outside influences and the will of the people are irrelevant. The reason such wars are prohibited is that the predictably set up a situation where a military force is engaged with a civilian population: a counterinsurgency situation. In such situations, torture, assasination, genocide, terrorism, and all the other worst atrocities of warfare become daily practices. That's why such wars are against the law. But the law is obviously not sufficient to protect idiots like you from your own idiocy, (afterall, you guys are arguing back and forth over how to win this particularly blatantly aggressive occupation) which is why I propose a more strict standard for military policy: NO COUNTERINSURGENCY WHATSOEVER. If you find yourself prosecuting counterinsurgency in a foreign land, you should assume that you are prosecuting an aggressive war. Yes, conceiveably, there are exceptions. But considering the cost of aggressive war and general worthlessness of war in general, why recognize their existence? Do we really need such ambiguously legal and moral conflicts? There is no baby in this bathwater; chuck it.
Corruption Is Not The Only Criteria
One would be hard-pressed to find a more corrupt government than that of Syngman Rhee in South Korea, all the way from right after WWII up to 1960. It was a long, hard struggle for the South Koreans as they sought to form a truly democratic government. But their success would never have had a chance if we had not defended the corrupt South Korean government when it needed defending.
Corruption needn't be a showstopper, so long as the government in question gives cooperation and real effort in the common cause. We can deal with corrupt governments without advocating corruption, else we should condemn our recent overtures to Russia.
Missing the point
Corruption is the icing on the cake. It is one of a long list of reasons why we should leave Afghanistan. The Karzai regime is corrupt and tyrranical by definition: they were set up durinig a foreign occupation which persists; therefore, they are a puppet regime of the occupier, quislilngs and collaborators that patriotic Afghans will predictably oppose for as long as Karzai has any grip on power. Comparisons to SK are absurd as a consequence, particularly considering the US intervention there was in response to a criminal foreign invasion, not the criminal foreign invasion itself. Corruption is also especially significant in Afghanistan in that the Taliban was the Afghan government most free from corruption in living memory. Indeed, their rise was largely buoyed by public disgust with the previous corrupt regime that our previous, covert intervention in Afghanistan led to, many elements of which are now back to their old tricks as elements of the Karzai regime. Corruption doesn't just strengthen the Taliban; it gives them objective righteousness; it makes them the good guys. And you know who that makes us.
The Measure of Success in War
"Can we measure success per dead US soldier or Iraqi civilian? Or maybe per billion dollars of expenditure?"
_________________
None of these is a measurement of either success or failure in war. Success in war is measured by achieving your strategic objectives and denying the same to the enemy. You do that by bending the enemy's will. Which is where those other considerations come in. Insurgencies are difficult precisely because the effects of your efforts are so diffused it becomes difficult to affect the enemy's will before your's gives out.
Success
Success in aggressive war consists of shaming its defenders into silence, permanently locking its authors into prison cells, and withdrawing all offending forces at the earliest possible moment. Let us know when you are ready to help us acheive victory.
Karsai, former Vice President of Enron
tagged as:- solution
I dooooooooooo believe that President Obama is challenged by the fact that if he sends more troop to Afganistan so McCrytal can be glorified that he knows he will be condoning the fraudulent Karzai government. I dooooooooooo believe that President Obama will make the right decision considering that Karzai was place in office by former vice president Cheney and pathethic former president Bush with the only intent to build a oil pipeline for the bootlegged oil from Iraq only after murdering Hussien. Well it just turned out that the feasibility of installing a pipeline through Afganistan mountanous terrain was completely inplausible or stupid greedy inspired vision of corrupted Bush/Cheney administration. Taking this into consideration, I dooooooooooo believe that President Obama will make the right decision and let that country go anyway it wants after we take our men and women soldiers out of their because after all it's their country and they can and have been doing anything they want not matter what they say to our faces. Games over.