Karen Yukie Yamada is not affiliated with any intelligence agency.

An Illegitimate Quest for Intelligence Part 1

Questioning the impact of recent legislative decisions regarding our government's

capabilities to spy on Americans is relevant and urgent. Questions that should

be answered by all law makers are: Did your read the Patriot Act? Are you

aware of current technological applications for eavesdropping, for satellite spy

imaging, and for harvesting large amounts of information from wireless systems?
Who pays for intelligence gathering activities, and who profits from these

activities?

Understanding the operational realities of surveillance is relevant to the debate

that has resurfaced about unchecked practices that allow our government to spy

on Americans. The above questions add meat to the contention that "more is not

always better" when it comes to gathering intelligence in the name of national

security.

Citing recent news articles adds to the collage of issues that must be seen as

part of a whole when discussing national security needs. Needs are generally

seen as different than desires within the context of human relationships. We can

assure our government that in their relationship to the public, few Americans

would questions their need for tools to fulfill their obligation to protect our borders,

to protect the integrity of our institutions and to protect public safety.

Of course, as an instrument of power, our government may have desires that are

in conflict with other obligations. For example, the obligation to create conditions

that provide opportunities for checks and balances within hierarchies to protect

the human structure of society. After all, it is the human structure of society

that create intangible value, and it is intangible value that makes the soul of a

country.

Identifying the social glue that bonds human structures, both public and private,

is not a difficult thing to do. It is directly related to the level of trust people have

in government institutions and private interests. As in human relationships, the

issue of trust can be measured by how well expressed statements or feeling

correspond with action that demonstrates what is spoken.

We should relentlessly remind our government of the cause and effect created

from mistrust by the public of their elected officials. We should insist that the

debate about national security needs hold deeper discourse. This is especially

true when domestic policies start to reflect a climate that is based on a lurking

enemy that cannot be clearly defined expect by the conditions that create them

The debate about our government's ability to spy on Americans goes to the heart

of what defines the pioneering spirit, the sense of individualism balanced with

seeing ourselves as a larger cohesive whole bound by certain principles.

Citing recent news articles adds to the collage of issues that must be seen as

part of a whole when discussing national security needs. According to a Wall

Street Journal article on August 22, 2007, the Pentagon will be shutting

down their anti-terror database because it failed to provide consistent analytic

information regarding potential threats to military personnel and facilities.

Known as Talon, the program was criticized in 2005 for improper storing of

information on activists and other peaceful demonstrations. The Pentagon also

acknowledged that some officials may have misused the program.

Scheduled to close on September 17, 2007, the WSJ reports that the information
gathered by Talon will be sent to an FBI database. Say what?! Is type of sharing

between intelligence agencies the result of streamlining the process for

information sharing between agencies promoted by the Patriot Act?

Such coziness between the Pentagon and the FBI raises more questions about

the difference between needs and desires of our government's intent. The blurring

of the lines between intelligence accessed for criminal investigations and

intelligence gathered by special operations by the military for terror threats is

a concern. We are not comforted by the military having jursidiction to gather

information about criminal activities.

Taking this example further warrants an inquiry into what type of intelligence

was gathered by Talon. If I were to think like someone who believed that seeds

of terror could be found within the sub-culture of anti-military and peace activism,

I probably would want photographs of demonstrations, random conversations

between these individuals on the phone and in usual meeting places. I might

also want information on their daily internet habits with random email

correspondence.

Consider the logistics of gathering such information. If it is true that the CIA

uses private contractors about 50% of the time to gather intelligence, imagine

who might be responsible for this eavesdropping, harvesting of wireless

conversations and cyber-spying. Private contractors? Intelligence officers from

county police departments? Not knowing much about who does the

intelligence gathering for Talon, I could guess that they may use the same

groups as the CIA in some instances.

In late 2005, NY Police Commissioner Paul Brown appeared on Democracy Now

to comment on the use of local intelligence unit officers to monitor peace

activists in New York who rode with Critical Mass. In a letter to the

Commissioner, I asked him if he believed that local intelligence officers should

be privileged to function without checks and balances as though they were

federal agents. If the Patriot Act can be broadly interpreted to allow local

intelligence officers certain powers to spy on Americans, the potential for abuse

should sound an alarm.

A plausible result of this policy could be that a local intelligence unit officer with a

salary of about $50-800,000/year were given powers to contract with federal

surveillance groups to identify potential threats within an organized peace

network demonstrating against military policies. The notion that international

terror groups would become embedded within a peace network may be far

fetched, but think about the cash flow generated for a few groups.

How much does surveillance cost? Eavesdropping on phone calls and in a

single meeting place may cost $150-125 thousand/month according to someone

who works in a spy technology shop. Multiply that by a dozen activists who have

productive lives. You get the picture about the income that results by a small

clandestine operation to spy on a core groups of activists. A cozy relationship

between federal agencies and the local police intelligence unit has some unseen

risks for those being watched.

Who pays? Who buys the information? And who would know who pays and

buys? When conditions are created to profit from abuses, abuses are inevitable.

Aside from strong leadership from elected officials and well-written policies, only

the decency and motive within the human structure of surveillance determine how

this information can be used.

Bribery as a means of control is predictable within security networks, and yes,

as with elected officials and lobbyists, it is up to the officials to say "no" to

corrupt practices. Spying is big business. Personally, I would like to see

legislation that makes a distinction between above the table spying and below

the table spying that is used for intelligence and security needs.

Further questions about the logistics about surveillance raises the alarm for

abuses. Who harvests the information, how is this information disseminated, who

stores the information, how is this information stored and who exposes abuses?

Recent articles in the NY Times highlight the ongoing effects of new

technological capabilities for spying in our society. The front page article on

September 11, 2007 describes the "surveillance boom" in China, and the interest

Wall Street has shown in surveillance systems for 24-hour video monitoring for

the sake of security. Their September 15th front page describes how surveillance

software can be used by private investigators to track the electronic trail of

spouses who are soon to be divorced.

Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnel made his statements to the

House Judiciary Committee about the NSA curtailing its use of warrantless

wiretapping since February 2007. Can he verify that this is limited to phone

and email conversations between an American and a foreigner overseas that

is a target of surveillance? Can he vouch for this given the number of daily

transactions that take place? And does the use of a "secret intelligence

court" provide enough oversight?

We should be concerned.

in the future could you please preview your lengthy cut & paste articles and edit out the double spacing?

even if i wanted to read one of them i wouldn't bother when the formatting is this crappy